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ABSTRACT
Supplier integration is becoming widely accepted as a key element of lean enterprises.
At the same time, the use of information systems to facilitate technical
communication has grown rapidly.  While the use of information technology to
encourage collaboration among manufacturers and suppliers has found repeated
success in various experimental efforts in the past, attempts to develop production
versions of information systems have encountered numerous difficulties.  This thesis
examines the reasons for this apparent lack of success in developing and using
information systems that fully support ongoing production operations and suggests
methods for overcoming the difficulties that are typically faced.
Data for this research were gathered from several sources:  published reports and
articles about specific experimental information system development projects, one
detailed case study of a “production” information system, and interviews with project
managers of another “production” system.  All projects had similar goals, that is, they
were all intended to enable technical information about manufacturing products and
processes to be electronically exchanged quickly and easily between the manufacturer
and its suppliers.
The analysis of the problem starts by identifying the key factors generally found to
have contributed to successful management of intra-company information systems
development projects.  Added to this are the insights gained through recent
experiments in the area of information systems for technical data exchange within the
supply chain.  Taken together, these form the basis for identifying enablers for
developing information systems for supplier integration.  These enablers are then
compared with the major success factors observed in projects aimed at developing
“production” versions of information systems to validate them as well as to identify
areas needing further research.
The most significant success factor identified is that a manufacturer must already have
a partnering relationship with its suppliers in order to build an effective information
system for contributing to greater collaboration.  Developing  an information system
for exchanging sensitive proprietary information requires a tremendous amount of
trust and cooperation among the participating companies.  Technical factors, such as
the choice of a common application suite and platform, appear to be less important in
the development of successful information systems linking manufacturers with their
supplier networks.
Thesis Supervisors:  
Dr. Daniel E. Whitney, Center for Technology, Policy, and Industrial Development
Dr. Kirkor Bozdogan, Center for Technology, Policy, and Industrial Development
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1 INTRODUCTION
Two revolutionary forces are overtaking the manufacturing world--one a technology,
the other a business philosophy.  The first is the appearance of powerful
internetworking technologies that allow the rapid exchange of vast quantities of
information.  The second is the growing movement to integrate suppliers more closely
into the manufacturing process.  While all this is going on, many companies also find
themselves faced with an aging information infrastructure incapable of adequately
supporting their business processes into the next century.  This thesis examines key
issues and concerns at the intersection of these developments.  Figure 1-1 graphically
depicts the area of focus of this thesis.
Advances in
Communications
Technology
Increasing
Supplier
Integration
Aging
Information
Infrastructure
Building
Information
Systems for
Supplier
Integration
Figure 1-1  Overview Of Forces Driving Development Of Information Systems
For Supplier Integration
The first chapter presents a detailed discussion of the research problem, tracing the
nature of key factors associated with both experimental and production attempts at
developing information systems to exchange technical data among engineering and
factory personnel at manufacturers and their suppliers.  It first identifies how these
systems are significantly different from those that have come before.  Most
importantly, they are intended to share far more complex information among people
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traditionally discouraged, if not explicitly forbidden, from communicating with each
other.  Then the methodology pursued in this thesis is presented, including the
analytical approach adopted and the data collection method used.  Finally, a
description of the remaining chapters outlines for the reader how the material will be
presented.
1.1 Motivation For Developing Information Systems
For Supplier Integration
The tremendous advances in networking technologies made over the last few years,
such as intranets, extranets, and the Internet, are already fundamentally redefining the
ways in which enterprises work together to design, build and support complex
products such as aircraft or automobiles.  Many corporations are engaged in building
information systems, frequently web-based, to increase supplier involvement in
product design and manufacturing in activities such as joint problem solving efforts
for product and manufacturing process improvements.1  The goal of these systems is
to foster collaboration among companies with differing core competencies to build a
better final product more efficiently.2 These firms, however, face difficult technical,
organizational and legal issues in their implementation efforts.3  Issues of
standardization, data security, information sharing, and support costs pose complex
challenges.  Meanwhile, smaller, lower-tier suppliers are still largely left out of this
digital revolution because they often lack the resources to access the many platforms
used by their larger customers.
Adding to the complexity of planning and implementing new systems, existing
information systems often have been patched so many times that they are virtually
incomprehensible and unmaintainable.  Though many of these systems are critical to
the manufacturing process, few companies still employ the systems’ original authors,
                                                
1 Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1992), p.24.
2 Bozdogan, Deyst et al. (1998), p.164.
3 Clark and Fujimoto (1991), p.332.
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hence typically hardly anyone has detailed knowledge of the internal workings of their
programs.4  
The current Y2K (Year 2000) crisis is an excellent example of the serious problems
that an aging information infrastructure can generate.   The push to verify that all
systems are Y2K compliant is bringing the widespread problem of outdated,
undocumented information systems to the forefront.  By forcing companies to
examine their existing systems in detail, Y2K is causing many companies to rethink
their information technology (IT) strategies and the business processes that drive
them.
All these factors have led to a dramatic increase in the number of companies
developing systems to build, replace or upgrade the systems that support their
manufacturing and business processes.  Depending on the source cited, however,
computer system upgrade and migration projects fail 40% to 80% of the time and, of
those that make it to completion, half cost 190% or more of their original estimates.5  
A great deal of money has already been spent on systems currently in use.  That fact
coupled with the likelihood of failure makes spending a great deal more money to
replace or add to existing systems a huge risk.  Moreover, new systems will continue
to be developed to improve upon existing ones.  Finding ways to deal appropriately
and effectively with legacy processes, systems and data will continue to be an issue
for the immediate future.  Developing a clearer identification of major issues, barriers,
and enablers for handling legacy systems and processes when building effective
information infrastructure systems over the supplier network offers potentially
significant benefits to the manufacturing community.  
1.1.1 UNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS
In two very important ways, information systems for supplier integration are
different from most other systems developed up to now.
                                                
4 Pressman (1992), p.8.
5 DePompa (1995), pp.60-65.
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First, they require the real time exchange of a much larger volume of data than most
applications.  Few networks have been designed until recently explicitly for the
exchange of 3-dimensional CAD data.  The technical challenges of designing systems
capable of handling these demands that can be extended to include virtually any
supplier’s platform, capabilities, and budget are enormous.
Second, they require that this information be shared freely yet securely among people
traditionally discouraged, if not explicitly forbidden, from collaborating and sharing
ideas with each other.  Social, legal, and organizational structures have been developing
since the industrial revolution to ensure that mission-critical information is never
compromised through access to it by outside organizations.  Overcoming each of these
challenges is even more daunting than the technical issues.  These characteristics
require special consideration when planning the development of an information
system for technical communication with suppliers.
1.2 The Gap Between Experimental And Production
Development Projects
In view of all the apparent benefits of using information technology to develop a
closer working relationship between manufacturers and suppliers, attempts to
develop and implement these systems are underway in nearly every corner of
industry.  Many of these projects, however, still founder long before they are ever
implemented in the production environment.  It is therefore not surprising that
extensive research is being conducted by industry, academia, and the government to
identify best practices in this area.
For the purposes of this thesis, a “production” project is one which was originally
conceived, proposed, and developed with its primary purpose to facilitate actual
business processes.  Any system whose original intent was primarily to gain
experience or test a concept is considered experimental.  Additionally, any project
funded by research groups or other sources intended for experimental systems is also
considered an experimental project.
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Though the results of experimental attempts to use information technology to
integrate suppliers and manufacturers have been promising, complicating factors not
tested in trials threaten to derail many production level development projects that
might have been successful under experimental conditions.  The central hypothesis of
this thesis is that when manufacturing companies try to develop a production
information system for inter-organizational technical communication, one not
considered or funded as experimental, many of their efforts either fail entirely or fail
to live up to expectations due to a lack of understanding of how information
technology is most effectively used and implemented.  This lack of understanding is
manifested in many ways:  
• Underestimating the complexity of automating the business processes involved.
• Overly optimistic development project schedule and cost estimates.
• Confused expectations about the utility and cost savings of the proposed system.
• Not appreciating the complexity of legacy systems and their associated processes.
These problems do not appear as clearly in experimental projects because, by their
nature, experiments do not examine difficulties securing funding and management
support from all the companies involved.  Also, projects that are not well defined or
that management is not clearly willing to support are not often chosen to be the
subject of experiments.
The problems generated by these misunderstandings are compounded by the fact that,
in manufacturing business processes, the switching costs are quite high.  Altering an
established process which is already in place without interfering with manufacturing
schedules is a very difficult undertaking that requires extremely detailed knowledge of
the inter-relationships and dependencies among all of the processes involved.
1.3 Research Goal
Considerable effort is currently being invested by both industry and academia to
identify key strategies that have proven effective in building information systems for
Building Information Systems To Integrate The Manufacturing Supply Chain
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communicating technical and other types of information between manufacturers and
their suppliers.  Some of the major questions being researched are:
• What strategies are manufacturing firms employing in building information
systems for supplier integration?  In particular, how are systems designed to
support collaborative engineering activities being developed?  What are the major
barriers most commonly encountered in these projects?  What enablers are being
deployed to address them?
• How critical is defining existing processes to the success of the information
systems development efforts?  What resources, such as employees’ time and
effort, should be devoted to defining the business or manufacturing processes the
information systems are intended to facilitate?
• How do firms address the challenge of having to integrate numerous and disparate
legacy systems used in existing processes?  What are the key issues regarding
legacy processes and systems that must be addressed for the project to succeed?
What is driving the longevity of the legacy systems?
• What are the major policy issues associated with intensified technical
communication among manufacturing enterprises?  How are costs and incentives
managed among different enterprises?  How are information sharing policies
impacted?
This thesis focuses specifically on identifying the critical areas that need to be more
thoroughly addressed to facilitate the successful development of information systems
for achieving greater collaboration with suppliers.  Key questions addressed here are:  
• What is the source of the discrepancies in success between experimental and
production efforts to build information systems for supplier integration?  
• What factors are not being accounted for in the experiments?  
• How can they be accounted for in future experimental research as well as in future
production efforts?
Introduction
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By finding the answers to these questions, this research is intended to bridge the gap
between the findings of the experiments and the experiences of the production
projects to develop a more complete project management approach for these systems.
This will hopefully have two significant benefits.  First, it will demonstrate to
researchers the need for further study of these issues.  This should prompt deeper
explorations that will yield substantiated recommendations.  Second, until that work
can be conducted, it will alert project managers and those considering starting such
projects that these issues are critical to their success but that conclusive
recommendations have not yet been developed.  While this thesis does not provide a
complete solution to the lack of concrete methodologies for dealing with issues like
mushrooming complexity, raising awareness that they pose significant risks for these
systems is an improvement over not addressing them at all.
1.4 Research Approach
The general approach this thesis takes is to compare and contrast representative
projects, both experimental and production, to identify their key differences.
1.4.1 DATA COLLECTION
This research focuses on the methods and results of four projects.  Two are
considered experimental, two production.  The experimental projects are both taken
from published articles and reports.  One of the production projects, being conducted
by Lockheed Martin Astronautics, was researched through several telephone and
email interviews over the winter of 1998-99.  The other was the subject of an
extended case study conducted at Boeing.
The case study approach was chosen over the survey approach because the issues
involved in the topic are quite complicated and span many different areas of expertise
in many different companies.  No one person or group has all the information needed
for a thorough analysis.  A detailed understanding is essential in order to gain any
trustworthy or meaningful insights into this area.  An in depth knowledge of a
production system is particularly needed to identify areas research needs to more
thoroughly address.
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Conducted over the summer of 1998, the case study examined the development of a
system called HABIT.  Its purpose is to automate Boeing’s HVC/AQS business
process,6 the quality assurance systems for both internal and external suppliers.  Data
were gathered during the summer of 1998 through interviews, attending project
meetings at various levels and stages of development, assisting engineers in related
tasks, such as data collection and analysis, and review of internal documentation
regarding the progress of the project.
1.4.2 ANALYTICAL STRATEGY
The general analytical strategy used here is to characterize general business practices
in information system development based on existing literature and experiences.  This
provides an initial analytical template for examining the two experimental information
systems projects.  This framework will then be amended based on the learnings of the
analyses of the experimental projects.  The amended framework will be used in
analyzing the “production” systems.  Enablers, key success factors, and mitigation
strategies from that framework juxtaposed against the experiences of the “production”
systems will suggest inferred actions project managers should be cognizant of as well
as suggest further research.
The first step is to understand in general the success factors associated with managing
IS development projects involving extensive software engineering.  Information
systems development has matured considerably over the last few decades.
Identifying best practices in the general case is a reasonable foundation upon which to
add the specific case of information systems for technical data exchange among
suppliers.
With an understanding of the best practices in software engineering project
management as an initial basis, the thesis goes on to examine two experimental
projects.  Key lessons from these projects, particularly their approach to supplier
integration issues such as technical connectivity, cost sharing, and information control,
                                                
6 HVC:  Hardware Variability Control
AQS:  Advanced Quality System
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are added to the initial knowledge base to form a reasonably comprehensive picture of
potential success factors for developing “production” information systems.
The actual experiences of production systems are examined next, paying particular
attention to those areas addressed by previous research but also considering key
points not addressed in the existing literature.  The specific experiences of the
production systems are then compared with the general framework for developing
information systems for collaboration with suppliers.  Gaps and inconsistencies
between research and production are identified.  Mitigation strategies, based on
approaches suggested or used in the production systems, will be advanced as
potential solutions.
Key Factors
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Experiements
Key Factors
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IS Project
 Management
Research
Key Factors
Encountered 
By Production
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 Development
Projects
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Figure 1-2  Overview Of Key Factors Approach
Figure 1-2 is a graphical representation of the research approach.  By identifying the
research findings and comparing them with actual experiences encountered in industry,
areas that require further attention in future experiments and research projects are
identified.  Suggestions for possible answers to these problems drawn from the
industry experiences are suggested as potential subjects for experiment and as stopgap
approaches for project managers whose systems will be under development before
such research is completed.
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1.5 Outline Of Chapters
Chapter 2 presents a basic introduction to information systems project management.
These standard information systems development techniques have been developed
over many years and form a reasonable foundation on which to build a framework for
developing the highly specialized systems for supplier integration.
Chapter 3 examines two specific experimental projects and the key points they
discovered.  These factors, added to the key points from Chapter 2, present a fair
representation of the major enablers for  developing an information system to
exchange engineering information in the manufacturing supply chain.
Chapter 4 describes two production efforts currently underway to develop and
implement these systems in aerospace companies.  The first project is being
conducted at Lockheed Martin Astronautics.  The second, explored over a three-
month case study, is a system known as HABIT being developed by the Boeing
Commercial Airplane Group.
Chapter 5 presents the full analysis of the data collected.  It examines how each of the
factors identified in Chapters 2 and 3 were followed or not in the production
environment and the reasons behind those decisions.  It identifies those issues that
proved critical in the production environment that were not sufficiently addressed by
research.  It also suggests options for dealing with those issues.
Chapter 6 presents conclusions, policy implications, and recommendations for further
research.
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2 INTRODUCTION TO INFORMATION
SYSTEM PROJECT MANAGEMENT
This chapter presents an introduction to basic information system development
project management practices.  The information given here, taken from several
different sources, was chosen to give a representative overview of best practices for
planning and developing IT systems.  The purpose of this discussion is to present a
basic framework for developing information systems.  The lessons learned from the
experimental systems, which are discussed in Chapter 3, can then be applied to this
framework to create a template for developing information systems for exchanging
technical data in the manufacturing supply chain.  The production projects will then
be analyzed with respect to this template.
The following three sections present major planning components of an IT
development project:  process definition, system definition, and feasibility
assessment.  They form a somewhat iterative process in that if the project as defined
in the process and system definition components is deemed infeasible during the
assessment phase, the process and system definition can be revised until they are
feasible or the project is abandoned.  The last section summarizes the key points of
this chapter.
2.1 Process Definition
The need to accurately define the business processes involved before proceeding to
system design is critical to building a system that will provide worthwhile
functionality.  The business and manufacturing processes drive the system design
choices such as applications and infrastructure.  This is captured in Umar’s
illustration of inter-relationships between key components of the information system
Building Information Systems To Integrate The Manufacturing Supply Chain
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development process which is presented in Figure 2-1.  The shaded circles represent
information technology components. 7
Business
Processes
Applications
Infrastructure
Drive
Drive
Enable
Enable
Figure 2-1  Inter-Relationships Between Key Components
Pressman presents a general methodology for information system development
projects.  Most system development projects originate with the recognition of a
problem that needs solving.  Once a general notion of what the system might do has
been identified and the decision has been made to initiate the development project, its
actual functionality must be defined.  To do this, all the stakeholders in the relevant
existing business processes, that is, the process owners, should sit down with the
development team and work out the basic system requirements specification.  In the
context of an information system that will address problems that may stem from
outside the company, representatives of those outside processes must also be
included in this discussion.  This is an important step not only in developing a good
system design, but also in cultivating acceptance and support of the most important
players in the project, the users and their managers.
The basic steps of this process are:
                                                
7 Umar (1997), p.7.
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1. Problem recognition.  This involves articulating the basic elements of the
problem and identifying the parties that are affected.
2. Evaluation and synthesis.  This step identifies information flows, both existing
and proposed, required functionality, and known constraints.
3. Specification.  The results of the first two steps are codified in the functional
and technical specifications.
4. Review.  The entire process is revisited often over the course of the project.
Although ideally all requirements are reviewed and agreed upon before major
development begins, in practice requirements are often revised repeatedly as
the project progresses and new issues are discovered, such as difficulties
dealing with existing systems, budgetary constraints, etc.
The initial focus through all of these stages should be on “what” the project is trying
to accomplish, not “how”.  The “how” will be addressed in the system definition
phase.  The key here is to fully develop the first two steps:  recognizing and
evaluating the problem.  This is usually done by some form of decomposition--
subdividing it into a set of smaller and more manageable problems.8  
Many times, when all the involved process owners are discussing problems they
would like solved by an IT system, they discover that the real source of the problem
is within their existing processes.  In these instances, solving the problem by defining
improved processes is cheaper, faster, and far more effective than trying to force an
IT solution would have been.  Again, this reinforces the concept that the proposed
solution, whether it involves IT or not, must be focused on defining the processes
optimally from the point of view of the customer-supplier relationships among the
process owners.
Working out as early as possible many of the details of how all these systems and
processes do and should interact should be expected to yield two very significant
benefits:
                                                
8 Pressman (1992), p.76.
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• A clearer, more accurate, and often simpler requirements specification
• Even if the IT project is never completed, the stakeholders will still have:
• A thorough, current understanding of their processes and how they fit into
“the big picture.”
• Non-IT enabled process improvements that come from discussing in detail
how processes interact with other process owners.
These benefits accrue to the involved process owners even if the system is never
developed beyond this point.
Ideally, at the end of the process definition phase, a document, often referred to as the
functional specification, is drawn up detailing the specific behavioral requirements of
the system.  Then the design of the technical aspects of the system can begin.
2.2 System Definition
Once the business processes to be enabled have been identified and the functional
specification describing what the system is intended to do has been written, the work
of actually choosing the technology architecture and planning the development of the
system itself can begin.  These decisions will ultimately become the technical
specification for the system.
Often, however, it is not possible to fully identify all the needs and processes ahead
of time.  The processes themselves are often revised as the users re-examine their own
processes and improve their understanding of others’.  In other cases, project
management staff may not be able to identify with certainty the best technical
approach to implement the proposed system.  To work these issues out and to begin
the requirements, a technique called prototyping is often a suitable answer.
Prototyping is the process of creating a model of the software to be built.  After the
overall objectives of the software have been defined and any other known
requirements identified, a prototype which represents those aspects of the system
that the user will see is built.  This is then used to help refine the requirements
further.  The process then iterates until the developer understands what exactly the
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customer’s needs are.  This technique has been found to be particularly useful for
systems dealing with highly complex technical data or functionality, such as
exchanging and manipulating engineering models.
Whether or not prototyping is used, the system designers must consider all the
factors that will impact the technical decision making process.  One of the most
important of these is the current status and planned use of legacy systems.  A legacy
system can be thought of as any system whose production use predates the current
development project.  This includes any systems the current development project will
be expected to interface with, no matter what organization the system is part of.
Generally, aside from typically being old and large, legacy applications have the
following characteristics:
• Critical to daily operations.
• Heavily invested in.
• Poorly documented:  documentation has been lost over the years if there ever was
any.
• Poorly understood:  nobody who built it is around to explain how it works.
• Inflexible and risky to change.
• Repositories of years of corporate experience and practices:  many otherwise
undocumented business rules are embedded in the code without companies
realizing it. 9
For all these reasons, legacy applications are an important concern for almost any IT
manager.  Upgrading or replacing them will require huge investments in building the
new system, retraining of all the users of the old system, development of new
contingency plans and security policies, and disruption of the vital services they
provide.  The benefits of changing the status quo, therefore, must clearly outweigh
these risks.  This should be addressed in the feasibility assessment discussed in the
next section.
                                                
9 Umar (1997), p.388.
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Depending on the nature of the proposed system, its designers have three options for
handling legacies:
• Rewrite them from scratch.  Though theoretically the most complete solution,
this option has several drawbacks.  Specifications for legacy systems rarely
exist and they usually have many undocumented dependencies.  Business
conditions will not wait for the new system to be implemented.  Finally, the
time needed to rewrite a legacy application may often make the rewrite itself a
legacy application.
• Integrate them with the new system.  This compromise solution is a common
choice as it minimizes risk and transition costs.  It is only feasible if the legacy
data and systems are not inherently unworkable over a long future period of
time.
• Migrate their functionality gradually.  This can be viewed as a slower, gentler,
more flexible version of the first strategy (rewrite from scratch).  If the legacy
systems must be replaced because they can not support new business
processes then developing and migrating functionality in an organized,
stepwise approach will allow for a smoother transition and often a better
system or set of applications than a blanket rewrite.
Depending on how old the system is, how easily it can be integrated with modern
systems and how critical it is to the business, any one or a combination of these may
be appropriate.  The final solution depends on which strategy presents the least risk
during transition from the legacy system to the new system.10  Regardless of the
strategy chosen, success in legacy application re-engineering requires the involvement
of the right people with the right tools, knowledge, and skill sets.11   The key for new
systems development and legacy systems management is to understand the business
processes they facilitate.  Ideally, this is done well before considering any changes to
the legacies.
                                                
10 Tronstad and Cox (1996), pp.60-62.
11 Umar (1997), p.403.
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Once the functional and technical specifications have been developed, validation
criteria and a testing plan can be chosen.  These are used to demonstrate successful
understanding and implementation of the specifications.  Additionally, the
preliminary user’s manual should be drafted if prototyping has not been done.  This
encourages the users and the developers to review the actual behavior of the software
and identify problems and misunderstandings early in the process, when they are least
costly to fix.12  
This iterative approach to software development projects is well summarized by
Umar’s “Methodology Template” given in Figure 2-2.
Problem
Analysis
Solution
Architectures
Implementation
Deployment
and
Support
First Iteration: Planning
Second Iteration: Prototyping
Third Iteration: First release
Fourth Iteration: Second release
Figure 2-2  Umar’s Methodology Template
Starting with the analysis of the problem, the system goes through several iterations
over the course of its lifetime.  The first is the planning and proof of concept stage.
The second iteration involves prototyping and experimentation.   The third iteration
yields the first production release of the system.  Each subsequent release is from an
additional iteration of the process.
                                                
12 Pressman (1992), pp.190-193.
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The end result of the system definition stage is a completed technical specification
designed to fully and accurately implement the functional specification.  The
feasibility of these project proposal documents must then be determined before
development begins in earnest.
2.3 Feasibility Assessment
Once the project requirements have been defined both functionally and technically,
the feasibility of the proposal should be thoroughly examined before proceeding with
development.  Feasibility depends primarily on two types of issues:  strategic and
financial.
2.3.1 STRATEGIC ALIGNMENT
The information system must support, or at a minimum not hinder, the strategic plan
of the organization.  A good information systems plan will be in alignment with a
good corporate strategy.  In a very real sense, the quality of the project will depend
on the quality of the strategic decisions made by upper management.  The inability to
realize value from IT investments is often due to the lack of alignment between the
strategic business plan and the IT plan for the corporation.13  In a more detailed
description of the issue Madnick and Wang state that:
In the case of inter-organizational systems within a
corporation, corporate strategy directs the role
definition and the configuration of the information
system that may span multiple organizational units.
Thus, although the individual systems may have
historically evolved for different purposes, with varying
technical specifications, the connectivity is now
mandated by the strategic requirements of the
corporation.  Since the boundaries of the different
systems involved fall within a single corporation, the
corporate strategy serves as an organizational
                                                
13 Henderson and Venkatramen (1993), pp.4-16.
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mechanism for the design and management of this type
of inter-organizational systems.14
This issue becomes much more complicated when more than one corporation
participates in the development of the information system.  It is not likely that a
system that perfectly fits with a manufacturer’s business strategy will always fits
perfectly with its suppliers as well.  The issue then becomes either treating the
supplier as an extension of the manufacturer or designing a system that can
accommodate both.  No clear evidence supports either approach as generally better or
worse; one or the other may be more feasible depending on the particular situation.
Establishing closer relationships with key suppliers allows manufacturers to design
and build better products more quickly and efficiently.15    The business strategy of
each company should reflect this fact and its information systems plan should be
developed accordingly.
Once past the initial hurdle of supporting the business strategy of the corporation,
corporate IT standards must also be accommodated.   Verifying that the system meets
defined corporate IT standards will avoid some of the biggest obstacles to gaining
upper management support.
Another way of looking at this issue of appropriately defining the processes involved
is to consider the proposed project in terms of the overall business strategy of the one
or more organizations involved.  Figure 2-3 shows the relationships between business
and technology strategies and infrastructures.
                                                
14 Madnick and Wang (1988), p.42.
15 Bozdogan, Deyst et al. (1998), pp.164-167.
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Business
Information
Technology
Strategy
Infrastructure
Business
Strategy
IT
Strategy
IT
Infrastructure
Business
Infrastructure
Figure 2-3  Strategic Alignment Model16
To be considered in alignment, the information technology project in question should
involve at least three of the components presented in Figure 2-3.  For example, an IT
infrastructure system might be directly in alignment with the corporate IT strategy
and provide functionality that directly supported the corporate business strategy.  An
alternative way of approaching the issue is to always “build towards your enterprise
architecture, not your legacy constraints.”17
Once the position of the proposed information system in the company’s long range
plans is determined, its value to the company is easier to assess.  This is  a critical
piece of information for the cost-benefit analysis.
2.3.2 COST-BENEFIT
As a lower bound on the problem, the system must be able to perform the same
functions as well as the existing systems.  In reality, of course, it must do much more
than that.   Management must also be concerned with how cost-effective the
proposed solution will be.  Along with maintaining the current functionality, the
project plan must demonstrate that the gains made by the new system will outweigh
all the costs of putting it in place.
Clearly defining both the costs and the benefits, then, is essential.  Unfortunately, this
can be extremely difficult to accurately predict, particularly for powerful but poorly
                                                
16 Umar (1997),  pp.20-21.
17 Telleen and Meltzer (1997), pp.35-39.
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understood new technologies such as the Internet.  This is true in large part because
often the greatest strength of a new technology lies not its ability to replace existing
methods, but in its ability to perform tasks far beyond the reach of current methods.18  
Even when the choice does not involve radically new technology the issue is still quite
thorny.  It is difficult for management to perceive the ongoing cost involved in keeping
old systems.  Pressman states:
Many programs that are pivotal to business operations
are becoming more and more difficult to maintain.
Patches are placed on top of patches, resulting in
programs that work inefficiently, fail too often, and do
not respond to user’s needs.  In fact, the maintenance of
aging programs has become prohibitively expensive for
many information systems, manufacturing, and
engineering organizations.  Yet, many managers think
that the cost to re-engineer these programs is also
prohibitively expensive.19
The more clearly the project manager can demonstrate these costs, risks and benefits
the more likely the management is to support the effort.  With a reasonably accurate
and complete understanding of the project’s goals, requirements, costs, and benefits
its overall value and feasibility can be predicted with some confidence.  Then an
informed decision to proceed, revise, or abandon the project can be made.
2.4 Summary
The general approach presented in this chapter can be summarized in three questions:
• What exactly is the proposed system supposed to do?
• How is the system supposed to accomplish this?
• Is the proposed system feasible?
                                                
18 Hammer and Champy (1993), pp.83-87.
19 Pressman (1992), p.119.
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These questions translate directly into three activities:  process definition, system
definition, feasibility assessment.  These activities are iterated until a feasible solution
is found.  Iteration may continue beyond that point until an optimal solution is found.
The basic template derived from this discussion is given in Table 2-1.
Process Definition
• Problem recognition:  Identify problem and related process owners including those at
external suppliers
• Evaluation and synthesis:  Clearly define existing internal and external processes and the
modified or new processes that the proposed system will support
• Specification: Define the exact functionality the system will provide to support these
processes
• Review
System Definition
• Select architecture to implement the functional specification including all internal and
external supplier or customer links
• Determine legacy system strategy  for all systems which will be involved
Feasibility Assessment
• Assess  alignment with business strategy of prime and key suppliers involved
• Assess  alignment with information technology strategy
• Analyze the costs and benefits of the proposed system for the prime and key suppliers
 
Table 2-1  Key Factors For Information Systems Project Management
The experimental projects described in Chapter 3 will add to this template.  Chapter 5
will use it to analyze the data on production systems presented in Chapter 4.
As a final note, Umar also offers the following important cautions, particularly when
considering the multi-organizational environment:
IT should be used to enable business decisions and
processes.  Make sure there are clear business drivers
before you get carried away with technology.
The life cycle for the reason for undertaking an effort
should be longer than the life cycle of the undertaking
itself.
There is a thin line between vision and hallucination.
Beware not to cross it.20
                                                
20 Umar (1997), p.22.
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3 EXPERIMENTAL PROJECTS
This chapter presents accounts of two experimental systems regarded as successful
demonstrations of how information technology can be used to enhance manufacturer
and supplier relationships.  The key success factors for each of these experiments are
summarized and integrated with the results from Chapter 2 at the end of this chapter.
These results will be used in Chapter 5 to analyze the gap between experimental and
production systems.  
3.1 InfoTEST - Caterpillar Enhanced Product
Realization Testbed
The Enhanced Product Realization (EPR) Testbed Project Phase 2 scenario was
proposed by Caterpillar Corporation and conducted by InfoTEST International.
InfoTEST represents the information technology division of the National Center for
Manufacturing Sciences (NCMS).  It is a non-profit company supported by over 30
industry and government members including 3M, Bay Networks, Caterpillar,
Hewlett-Packard, Hughes Electronics, IBM, Sprint, Texas Instruments, and the Oak
Ridge and Sandia National Laboratories.21 InfoTEST is currently conducting
experimental tests to evaluate the business uses of  secure collaborative engineering
using the Internet on behalf of its members.  The projects receive no external funding.  
3.1.1 PROJECT GOAL
The  experiment specifically addresses the scenario Caterpillar faces when a customer
requests a modification to its Caterpillar Challenger tractor to match soil conditions.
The objective is to determine if collaborative engineering between Caterpillar
personnel and suppliers could reduce the time required to deliver the modification to
the customer.  EPR particularly seeks to determine the technical requirements that
must be satisfied to support collaborative engineering across multiple organizations.
                                                
21 Further information can be found at the public web site:  http://www.infotest.com
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Once the Caterpillar scenario is complete, InfoTEST’s next goal is to extend the
testbed project to include the automakers who belong to NCMS.22
3.1.2 DESCRIPTION
The EPR Testbed project was conducted as an experiment to evaluate the business
value of conducting secure collaborative engineering over the Internet.  This particular
phase addressed issues related to the deployment of extranets for enabling
organizations to conduct collaborative engineering project relationships with
customers and suppliers.  Caterpillar Corporation was the test subject.  Some of the
key issues being examined were ensuring secure communications and interoperability
between different applications on different information infrastructures.  Setting up a
Virtual Private Network (VPN) using public key cryptography, and choosing
applications that are accessible from commercial, off-the-shelf web browsers across all
targeted platforms was the solution chosen.  Avoiding non-value added activities such
as data format conversion, an activity which may actually take value away, was also a
key concern.
The test scenario involved setting up a system whereby a customer at a Caterpillar
dealership could request a modification to a tractor.  A Caterpillar engineer is assigned
and forms a collaborative team composed of engineers from all organizations involved
in the modification, including external suppliers, to develop and complete the
modification.  Security access is granted to team members and analysis begins.  Over
the next five days the team analyzes the problem, develops alternatives, selects the
best option, has the parts fabricated and shipped to the dealer where they are installed
and the project is completed.23  This scenario is summarized in Table 3-1.
                                                
22 Sliwa (1997), p.1
23 D.H. Brown Associates (1997), p.5.
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Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5
Customer Initiates
Request
Initial Team
Meeting
Final Design
Review
Conference
Team
Implementation
Conference
Customer Status
Update
Dealer Submits
Service Request
Conduct Analysis
Activities
Release To
Manufacturing
Fabricate
Components
Dealer Installs
Components
Engineering Team
Review
Review Design
Alternatives
Update Product
Information
Schedule Dealer
Service
Finalize Product
Information
Form
Collaborative
Team
Review
Manufacturing
Schedule
Procure Materials Update Service
Documents
Team Leader
Closes Project
Contact Team
Members
Customer Review Schedule
Manufacturing
Resources
Ship Components
Preliminary
Evaluation
Activities
Table 3-1  The EPR Testbed Scenario
Although the expected five-day turnaround for any product modification may be a bit
optimistic, the experiment demonstrates the tremendous increase in capability
possible with the right processes and supporting technology.  To fully utilize the
benefits of the new information system, organizational barriers had to be changed to
allow for the rapid formation of teams and solutions.   The focus was on choosing an
appropriate mix of technologies from among those already determined in consultation
with the suppliers to support the effort.  Table 3-2 shows the packages selected for
various functions in the EPR.
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Tool
Category Product
EPR
Application
Platforms
Supported
Team
Communications
MDL Communique! Videoconferencing
Whiteboarding
Windows NT,
HP-UX
World Wide Web
Browser
Netscape Navigator
DASCOM WebSEAL
Web Access
e-mail
Secure Web Access
Windows NT,
HP-UX
Windows NT,
HP-UX
Database Access WebEnable International
Marketing Encyclopedia
FileNet @Mezzanine
Product Information Retrieval
Workflow, Version Control,
Document Management
Java-enabled Browsers
Windows NT,
HP-UX
Engineering
Visualization
EAI Visify & Netify
HP Shared 3D Viewer
CAx Model Viewing and
Annotation
Collaborative CAx Model
Viewing and Annotation
Windows NT,
HP-UX
Windows NT,
HP-UX
Application
Sharing
HP SharedX Collaborative CAx Modeling
sessions
X Windows
Display Servers
CAx Application PTC ProEngineer Feature-based Solid Modeling
Downstream Applications
Windows NT,
HP-UX
Table 3-2  EPR Collaborative Tools
Bandwidth limitations constrain the real-time exchange of highly sophisticated
technical drawings and models.  Like memory and processing power, however, these
capabilities are growing dramatically.  At the time of the experiment, leased lines and
other higher-end networking capabilities were purchased to support the endeavor, but
the project managers were uncertain if in the future the demand for these capabilities
would be sufficient to ensure they were available at reasonable costs for suppliers.
Since then, prices for such capabilities have dropped and with technologies such as
cable modems looming on the horizon it appears that bandwidth considerations will
be dramatically decreasing in significance.24
                                                
24 Moore's Law: The observation made8u in 1965 by Gordon Moore, co-founder of Intel, that the
number of transistors per square inch on integrated circuits had doubled every year since the integrated
circuit was invented.  Moore predicted that this trend would continue for the foreseeable future. In
subsequent years, the pace slowed down a bit, but data density has doubled approximately every 18
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3.1.3 RESULTS
The EPR Testbed project focused almost exclusively on finding appropriate
technologies for the situation.  Ease of communication, speed, and security concerns
were all treated as primarily technology problems rather than process or
organizational ones.  While this provided valuable information about the capabilities
of various software products, it was not an entirely satisfying result, as was noted in
a report by Price Waterhouse Coopers LLP its assessment of the project as quoted in
the D.H. Brown & Associates Executive Summary of the EPR Testbed:
EPR2 had the technical capability to provide a secure
enclave, but, because it was a testbed, did not institute
the policies and procedures that would be necessary to
safeguard information assets within a production
environment.
The report observed that risks could have been
substantially reduced or eliminated by further
refinements in the design and administration of the
environment.  The report further observes that
improvements made to VPN and secure Web server
products since the EPR2 architecture was designed now
successfully address several of the identified technical
weaknesses.25
This highlights the issue of rapidly advancing capabilities in data security and project
management software.  The report readily admits that the project did not address the
policies and procedures that would be instrumental in building an effective security
approach.
Other findings included an assessment of the Internet’s viability as a communications
medium for technical data exchange.  Though adequate for applications such as
                                                                                                                                          
months, and this is the current definition of Moore's Law, which Moore himself has blessed. Most
experts, including Moore himself, expect Moore's Law to hold for at least another two decades.
25 D.H. Brown Associates (1998), p.5
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interactive collaborative design tools, it was barely sufficient for videoconferencing.
Encryption technologies, key elements of the security plan, also slowed performance.
3.1.4 KEY FACTORS
This project explicitly focused on the technical issues, not the organizational issues,
for collaborative engineering.  The key findings from the project report are:
• The information infrastructure within and between organizations should be flexible
and sufficient to accommodate the needs of the intended use.  Methods to enforce
bandwidth ceilings on applications like videoconferencing must be used.
• The tools should be commercially available for multiple platforms and easy to use.
• User education is needed to assist personnel in understanding their roles in a
collaborative environment.
• Organizations must assume that those with whom they collaborate are also
collaborating with their competitors and should structure both policies and
technical environments accordingly.  Access to the extranet would not allow
access to the company’s intranet.
A key success factor the EPR project identified is the use of secure extranet
technologies to enable collaborative development.  Also, because it is difficult to know
which organizations will be needed for a given project ahead of time, a common
communication network, such as the Internet, must be the foundation for
communicating.  Since few companies have similar platforms, the highly interoperable
TCP/IP communication protocol proved reasonable and adequate for most purposes.
Quick setup of security measures, such as access lists and accounts for participants
external to Caterpillar, further proved to be quite important.
3.2 McDonnell Douglas - Northrop Grumman
Virtual Company
In 1994, McDonnell Douglas presented to the US Air Force a proposal for
redesigning the engine nacelles and thrust reversers on the C-17 transport in an
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attempt to reduce the cost and weight of the aircraft.  Key in this proposal was the
recommendation to shift to aluminum, rather than titanium, for the production of the
nacelles.26
3.2.1 PROJECT GOAL
McDonnell Douglas, prior to its merger with Boeing, and Northrop Grumman
structured their collaborative initiative as a  Virtual Company with the stated purpose
of bringing the C-17 nacelle redesign to market.  McDonnell Douglas is the prime
contractor to the US Air Force on the program and Northrop Grumman is the
principle subcontractor.  The primary goal of the redesign is to improve the
affordability of the nacelle, which originally was unique to the C-17 and much more
expensive than most others.27  This cost-control focus helped motivate the Virtual
Company experiment.
3.2.2 DESCRIPTION
Both companies agreed on a standard common platform, Unigraphics CAD/CAM
software and IMAN project management software.  This decision required Northrop
Grumman to purchase 40 seats of the Unigraphics package.  EDS assisted with the
rollout, stationing technical representatives at both Northrop Grumman and
McDonnell Douglas.
All product design was done by McDonnell Douglas and then transmitted via T1 over
the Internet to Northrop Grumman for tool design, fabrication, and assembly.    This
early release of engineering designs  was called Progressive Disclosure and was
implemented specifically for the C-17 Virtual Company program.  Instead of releasing
a single set of drawings at the conclusion of the design phase, a series of progressive
releases were sent to Northrop Grumman during the design process allowing them to
begin tool design work much earlier than usual.
                                                
26 Smith (1994), p.27.
27 Phillips (1997), p.30.
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Most communication was done using the 3-D solid models.  Actual engineering
drawings were not released until late in the design process.  They were still needed,
however, because the industry as a whole was not yet mature enough to rely
exclusively on the 3-D electronic models.  Engineers and shop floor personnel both
felt more comfortable with 2-D paper drawings in addition to the computer models.
That has been changing slowly, however, as read-only workstations have been
installed on the shop floor to allow the work to be carried out in a full digital manner.
Northrop Grumman also had a team on-site at McDonnell Douglas to provide input
on manufacturability issues.
This setup allowed Northrop Grumman to work on tool design while McDonnell
Douglas was still working on part and assembly designs.  This concurrent
development meant that when the design of a part was finalized the tools for
manufacturing it were already being fabricated.28
3.2.3 RESULTS
Both companies achieved shorter cycle times and better part fit the  first time with
less rework.  The experiment was deemed a success and plans have been underway to
extend the collaboration to lower tiers of the supply chain.
3.2.4 KEY FACTORS
Common  software platforms are critical.  Implementation can be extremely difficult
and expensive even for large companies.  The on-site EDS technical representatives
made implementing the new software packages much easier than it would have been
otherwise.
The project was deemed a success in large part because it facilitated early exchange
and review of engineering designs.  It was less expensive to spend time engineering up
front than to try to retrofit the part.29
                                                
28 Martin (1997), pp.76-78.
29 This is true of information system design as well.
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3.3 Summary Of Key Success Factors In
Experimental Projects
The primary success factors identified in both projects can be summarized as follows:
• Flexible information sharing policies.  Both projects recognized that information
would need to be released more quickly and easily than existing policies allowed.
• Use of commercially available software packages that run on multiple platforms
and are easy to learn and use.  
• Choose a standard suite of applications for all participants.  Avoid non value
added and potentially damaging data conversion activities.  For any company
installing a new package or system, adequate technical support must be available
for all parties for the implementation to be successful.
• The information infrastructure within and between organizations should be flexible
and sufficient to accommodate the needs of the intended use.  Both projects here
chose the Internet for this purpose.  Methods to enforce bandwidth ceilings on
applications such as videoconferencing must be used.
• User education is needed to assist personnel in understanding their respective
roles in a collaborative environment.
• Organizations must assume that those with whom they collaborate are also
collaborating with their competitors and should structure both policies and
technical environments accordingly.  Access to the extranet would not allow
access to the company’s intranet.
Implementing these factors, however, can be very difficult in a production
environment.  As detailed in the next chapter, these factors are far from sufficient for
managing a successful project.  
Combining these lessons learned with those summarized in Chapter 2 results in a
more complete list of key success factors shown in Table 3-3.
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Process Definition
• Problem recognition:  Identify problem and related process owners including those at
external suppliers
• Evaluation and synthesis:  Clearly define existing internal and external processes and the
modified or new processes that the proposed system will support
• Determine what user training on their role in supplier integration will be needed
• Determine what information sharing policies will need to be changed
• Specification: Define the exact functionality the system will provide to support these
processes
• Review
System Definition
• Select architecture to implement the functional specification including all internal and
external supplier or customer links
• Choose a common platform and suite of applications
• Ensure security is easy to implement quickly
• Choose  the common  network infrastructure, such as the Internet
• Determine legacy system strategy  for all systems which will be involved
Feasibility Assessment
• Assess  alignment with business strategy of prime and key suppliers involved
• Assess  alignment with information technology strategy
• Analyze the costs and benefits of the proposed system for the prime and key suppliers
 
Table 3-3  Amended Summary of Key Factors
These factors  form the basis of the framework used in Chapter 5 for analyzing the
“production” projects presented in Chapter 4.
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4 PRODUCTION PROJECTS
This chapter presents two production information systems  projects.  Development
efforts on both continue as of the writing of this thesis.  Unlike the experimental
projects reported in the previous chapter, the long term success or failure of these
systems is not yet fully known.
4.1 Lockheed Martin Astronautics Electronic
Commerce
Lockheed Martin Astronautics (LMA) conceived the notion of using information
technology to improve communications with its most important customer, the US Air
Force, about six years ago as part of an effort to develop “Value Focused
Relationships.”  Reasoning that there might also be benefits in setting up a system to
communicate more closely with its own suppliers, LMA has undertaken a program
known as  “Electronic Commerce with Suppliers.”30  
4.1.1 PROJECT GOAL
Since its inception, Electronic Commerce With Suppliers has been quietly growing
into a productive tool for communicating with suppliers for many company
programs.  The project’s mission statement is to:
Provide an information systems solution, leveraging
current and emerging technologies that will support and
maintain effective communication at multiple levels of
our joint enterprise, thereby enhancing and
continuously improving quality, reducing cost and
compressing cycle time.
                                                
30 Information on the LMA Electronic Commerce With Suppliers project was collected via telephone
and email interviews and review of presentations on the project.
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Of Lockheed Martin’s over 3000 suppliers, 32 account for 80% of the total dollar
value of its purchases from suppliers.  By improving communications and reducing
overhead with just those 32 suppliers, LMA can dramatically impact its overall costs.
This makes focusing the project for maximum benefit relatively simple.
4.1.2 PROJECT DESCRIPTION
Rather than trying to build a single application to encompass the many different
communication needs of each of LMA’s programs, such as RFPs31, engineering
specifications, purchasing data, etc., Electronic Commerce is composed of several
different applications.  As each application is completed its functionality is
demonstrated and offered to the various programs, such as the Launch Vehicle
Program.  If the program owners feel that a particular application will be beneficial to
their supplier relationships they can take over funding for their own specific
implementation.  Each program and its suppliers have their own electronic heritage of
information systems to which the application must be tailored.  
The order in which each type of communication application is developed is a direct
function of how much recurring effort is devoted to it.  Figure 4-1 depicts the life
cycle of data exchanged between LMA and its suppliers for a given contract.  The
largest amount of information exchange occurs in the stages between LMA sending its
initial engineering data and the supplier submitting its SDRL (Supplier Data
Requirements List).  Data transferred during this period includes engineering
specifications, key characteristic (KC) measurement data, SOWs (supplier specific
Statement of Work which supplement engineering drawings), and failure reports.
Currently deployed applications include videoconferencing, contract data and supplier
documentation delivery, and supplier access to certain LMA engineering applications
such as wiring diagrams.  
                                                
31 RFP:  Request For Proposal
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Figure 4-1  Lockheed Martin’s Contract Data Life Cycle32
Fully developing supplier access to LMA engineering drawings and models, as well as
LMA access to supplier drawings, is a key concern at the moment.  Several of LMA’s
key suppliers own the intellectual property rights to the parts they produce while
LMA owns the rest.  In part for this reason, information control policies are tailored
to each specific situation rather than trying to force a single solution for all situations.
The project owners have developed their own methodology for implementing these
systems.  Once a situation has been identified where Electronic Commerce With
Suppliers could be of help they form a communications team consisting of the process
owners and IT staff of both the supplier and the program.  This key step often results
in improved communication and efficiency before any new technology is introduced.
The initial funding for Electronic Commerce With Suppliers came from Air Force
programs which have proven to be more willing than their commercial sector
counterparts to fund experimental but promising new ideas.  Securing funding from
                                                
32 RFI:  Request For Information.  CM:  Configuration Management
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within LMA has been more problematic.  Typical of many large companies, within
LMA several different initiatives are vying for limited budget resources.  
A related problem is coordinating all the different initiatives and programs so that
Lockheed Martin presents a consistent and unified face to the outside world, including
both its customers and suppliers.  With each program developing its own systems and
solutions, as well as having multiple quality improvement initiatives, suppliers must
deal with very different systems and procedures for each different program they
supply.  
4.1.3 ANTICIPATED RESULTS
Although the project is not fully implemented, the expected benefits are already
beginning to be realized.  The benefits of this system development approach are
clearly demonstrated in Figure 4-2.  This chart, taken from a status report
presentation for the Electronic Commerce project, depicts the cycle time for existing
LMA processes in comparison with the expected cycle time once Electronic
Commerce has been implemented.
10 017203032 25 15 5
Current Cycle Time
Expected Cycle Time
Contracting Process
Contracting Process
18 Weeks
12 Weeks
10 Weeks
14 Weeks
Production Processing
Weeks
Production Processing
Figure 4-2  Lockheed-Martin’s Projected Cycle Time Reduction After
Electronic Commerce Implementation
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As Figure 4-2 shows, one of the expected gains from the Electronic Commerce is an
over 30% reduction in cycle time.  Other benefits, such as the improved
communication and understanding among process owners who participate in the
communications teams working on the project, remain harder to predict, quantify, and
measure.
4.1.4 ELECTRONIC COMMERCE KEY POINTS SUMMARY
The key factors in this project can be organized into three areas:  process definition,
system definition, and business issues.  They are examined here in that order.
4.1.4.1 Process Definition
Many in LMA would argue that this is the single most important factor to
success.  Careful attention is paid to business processes beforehand and user
requirements throughout.  Lockheed Martin is taking a flexible, case-by-case,
application-by-application approach to each program’s unique situation that
breaks the problem into manageable parts.  Process ownership is critical.
Having those people who have the most knowledge and stake in the process
come together and talk about what they need, what they are doing, and what
they should be doing is crucial to developing a successful system and
implementation.  Re-examining the existing processes yields significant
benefits for all parties involved even if the technology is never implemented.
Resolving the information sharing issues is also a key part of the process
definition.  Significant security measures are included in the information
systems deployed.  The specific information sharing and security policy
issues are handled primarily on a case-by-case basis.
4.1.4.2 System Definition
The specific tailoring of each system to each program makes the system
exceptionally useful in facilitating the program’s business processes.  This
approach is generally flexible and particularly accommodating with respect to
legacy systems throughout the development and implementation process.
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4.1.4.3 Business Issues
The most critical business issue the project has encountered is the lack of
explicit management commitment in the planning stages to fund development
and ongoing maintenance of the information systems.  Top-level support
would have been very helpful but has been nearly impossible to secure in
advance.  IT is still largely viewed as a necessary expense, not as a way to
save money and improve product quality and delivery time, and certainly not
as the key to long-term viability and success.  Project management is
measuring and documenting cost savings and efficiency improvements to raise
awareness and credibility for the project.  By demonstrating its usefulness in
concrete terms, it will hopefully be able to distinguish itself from the other
initiatives within the company that it must compete with for funding.  Project
managers made a key decision to focus on the top few suppliers LMA works
with to maximize the effectiveness of the funds they do have.  As the project
develops a positive track record, management support is likely to grow.
The other critical business issue is the role suppliers play.  Electronic
Commerce’s  flexible approach to suppliers is one of this project’s greatest
strengths.  It is unreasonable to expect that any system for such specialized
applications as these could be fully in line with each company’s business and
technology strategies.  By accommodating supplier interests as much as
possible, LMA is fostering a collaborative atmosphere and relationship with
its suppliers.
4.2 The Boeing HABIT System
The HABIT system was chosen for the case study because:
• Its purpose is to facilitate sharing technical information to solve production
problems.
• This technical data exchange will be amongst many different types of
organizations both inside and outside the company.
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Though ostensibly a Boeing-wide or at least BCAG33-wide project, the 777 program
is a central player in the design and development of the system.  How the 777
program has impacted the project is addressed throughout this discussion.
This case study is a detailed examination of work-in-progress.  HABIT is a web-based
system which is intended to improve efficiency and quality of airplane production by
collecting all the information needed to build an airplane in one centralized system.  It
should also be noted that shortly after this case study was completed (August 10,
1998) Boeing underwent a drastic reorganization at the highest levels which resulted in
a plan to reduce its workforce by nearly 50,000 employees over the following two
years.  As of the writing of this thesis, approximately 10,000 people had already been
laid off.  Rumors of impending major changes abounded during that summer, creating a
great deal of anxiety.  This uncertainty, coupled with fear of the impact of the
developing economic crisis in Asia,34 almost undoubtedly impacted some of the
decisions made for this project.
The first section presents a background discussion of the HABIT system.  This
provides an understanding of the environment within which the development is
occurring and the many forces influencing it.  A more detailed description of the
project itself is given next:  its purpose, scope, and development plan.  The last
section presents an examination of the key factors in the project and the relationships
among them.
4.2.1 BACKGROUND
This section first presents an introduction to Boeing Commercial Airplane Group’s
supplier relationships as they were at the time of the case study.  It also gives special
attention to how the 777 program handles its suppliers.  Then a background to the
HABIT system is presented, including an explanation of the existing and proposed
business processes it will facilitate (e.g., HVC, AQS, BPSP).35  Included in this
                                                
33 Boeing Commercial Airplane Group
34 Several wide body airplane orders from Asian companies were canceled during the time this case
study was conducted.
35 HVC:  Hardware Variability Control
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discussion is an example of how the manufacturing processes are handled without the
HABIT system.
4.2.1.1 Introduction To BCAG Supplier Relationships
Boeing began building airplanes in 1916.  Since that time the company has had
more than one name change, seen two World Wars, developed dozens of
different products, and acquired numerous other companies.  It is not
surprising that its supplier relationships would vary widely, reflecting the
different and changing environments the company has experienced.  Boeing
does not have central supplier management for all of its divisions (BCAG,
ISDS, etc.).  In fact, even within BCAG, different relationships exist between
different airplane programs and the same supplier.  This section describes
BCAG’s supplier relationships in general, paying special attention to the
nature of the 777 program supplier relationships.
At the time this case study was conducted, BCAG’s supplier base was
entirely managed by the BCAG division referred to as Materiel.  Its mission
statement includes the following line:
Materiel supports suppliers who align
themselves with the BCAG business plan and
who focus on the measures of success in a global
economy:  fewer defects, shorter cycle time,
lower costs and higher customer satisfaction.
To support this mission statement, Materiel has a complex strategic model
including, but not limited to, all of the following goals and systems:  AQS
(Advanced Quality System), JIT (Just In Time), reduced cycle time, reduced
cost of procurement, integration between BCAG and supplier systems, and
integration with BCAG business strategies.36
                                                                                                                                          
AQS:  Advanced Quality System
BPSP:  Build Position Standard Process
36 From the “MOP/PP/IBO Strategic Model”
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Materiel’s organizational structure is similarly complex.  Some suppliers are
managed according to the airplane programs they supply (e.g., 747/767,
737/757), their location (e.g., Australia/Taiwan, Japan), the purpose of their
products (e.g., wings, cargo system), and others merit their own team (e.g.,
Northrop Grumman).  While this level of complexity may be justified by the
complexity of the product and other forces affecting supplier relationships, it
also makes it extremely difficult even for those inside the company to know
who to go to with questions, problems, or suggestions.  This is also confusing
for suppliers who provide parts to multiple airplane programs.  This internal
difficulty, combined with the traditional reservations about dealing too closely
with outsiders without full sanctioning by Materiel, has tended to inhibit
developing collaborative relationships.
Not surprisingly, BCAG appears to have placed fairly little emphasis on
involving suppliers in engineering and design decisions.  It is implicit in most
supplier interactions that BCAG has superior knowledge and capability than
the supplier.  If a supplier has difficulty manufacturing a part to BCAG’s
standards, it is common practice for BCAG engineers to visit the supplier site
to resolve the problem.  Depending on the situation, this could be viewed as
cooperative, recognizing that both companies have a common goal, or as
condescending, where BCAG could be seen as forcing itself on the supplier
entirely for its own benefit while the supplier’s benefit may amount to only
an incidental concern.  Though far from universal, the suspicion that many
suppliers cannot be trusted from a technical standpoint also inhibits
development of truly partnering relationships.
Lucas cites Bhote’s four stages of supplier relationships in her thesis: 37
• Confrontational:  distrust, no commitment, no tapping of supplier
expertise or creativity.
                                                
37 Lucas (1996), p.24 citing Keki R. Bhote, Strategic Supply Management:  A Blueprint for
Revitalizing the Manufacturer-Supplier Partnership , (New York:  American Management Association,
1989), p.14.
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• Arm’s Length:  suspicion, limited information exchange.
• Goal Congruence:  limited trust, mutual sharing of plans.
• Full Partnership:  trust, early supplier involvement in product designs,
single supplier.
For the most part, BCAG recognizes the value of having a Full Partnership
relationship with its suppliers.  Unfortunately, it is still mired in difficulties
trying to get there.  Depending on the specific supplier and program, BCAG’s
current supplier relationships might best described as moving from Arm’s
Length to Goal Congruence.  
4.2.1.1.1 777 SUPPLIER RELATIONSHIPS
The 777 program is by far the newest of Boeing’s commercial airplane
programs.  One of its defining characteristics is its use of state-of-the-art
techniques in all areas of manufacturing, including supplier relations.  Started
in 1992, 777 made a concerted effort to forge close relationships with its
suppliers.  A separate division, called IBO (International Business
Operations), was created to manage 777’s international suppliers.  Though
this organization has since been incorporated into Materiel, 777 still enjoys a
closer, more cooperative relationship, one that approaches full partnership,
with its supplier base than the other airplane programs.
4.2.1.2 Project History
The HABIT project started as many separate, relatively small, good ideas that
have since grown into a very large and ambitious system.  The name itself is an
acronym of acronyms.  HABIT stands for HVC/AQS Build Integration Tool.
HVC (Hardware Variability Control), AQS (Advanced Quality System), and
the Build Tree embodied in the BPSP (Build Position Standard Process Guide)
are each discussed later in this section.  The system, if fully implemented and
utilized, has the potential to revolutionize airplane production speed and
quality but the benefits are difficult to predict with certainty.  This has made
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gaining support, either from management or potential users, difficult.  Since
HABIT represents a consolidation of so many different initiatives and
programs any meaningful introduction to the system must include a
description of its ancestors.  This section describes HABIT’s origins.
4.2.1.2.1 HVC
Hardware Variability Control (HVC) is a quality control process that uses
cross functional management of the design and build processes to improve the
fit, performance, and service life of airplane hardware.  It uses key
characteristic (KC) measurements on engineering drawings to measure how
much a given part or assembly deviates from nominal.  Figure 4-3 gives an
example of an engineering drawing with KCs indicated by .  HVC
requirements are “flowed down” to suppliers via Boeing engineering
drawings.38  
The HVC process was codified in BCAG Operating Procedure Agreement 6-
1000-183 which was issued December 14, 1995 with the intent to standardize
the many separate HVC activities going on throughout BCAG at the time.
This process was to be implemented on all new designs, existing designs when
extensive revisions were made, and special projects in BCAG.  The last two,
existing designs and special projects, were given some flexibility in
implementing HVC.
The HVC program was expected to yield many benefits.  In particular, HVC
was introduced to BCAG as an effort to:
• Use the Build Tree to integrate and focus the design effort.
• Standardize build positions.
• Reduce the number of build positions and increase part-to-part indexing.
• Use factory process capabilities in tolerance analysis.
                                                
38 BCAG “General Operations Requirements Document for Suppliers - External/Internal
Suppliers/Program Partners”  D953W001 Rev D 1996
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• Document and control manufacturing processes to reduce variation.
• Capitalize on the reduction in variation by improving speed and reducing
rework.
• Implement SPC (Statistical Process Control) analysis.
• Provide for process acceptance instead of part acceptance.
The HVC process is described as a series of steps (A-H) each of which falls
into a phase of the Plan-Do-Check-Act cycle shown in Table 4-1.
Plan
Step A: Establish Product Requirements
Step B: Establish Supporting Cross-Functional Team (CFT) Structure
Step C: Perform Concurrent CFT Activities
Step D: Prepare to Build
Do
Step E: Build and Measure Product
Check
Step F: Does the Product Meet Customer Requirements?
Act
Step G: Develop Process Improvement Activities
Step H: Confirm Process Acceptance
Table 4-1  The AQS Plan-Do-Check-Act Cycle39
The level and manner of HVC implementation across BCAG varies
considerably from program to program.  In the 777 program, for example,
HVC was implemented from the beginning as an official component of the
business plan.  The originally defined KCs are documented in a two volume
set known as the UMED-40.   Many of these, however, are no longer tracked
or used.   
HVC use is much lower in most other BCAG programs.  One reason for this is
that HVC is often regarded as a tool for solving chronic problems, not for
routine use.  Some groups are earnestly developing systems for prioritizing
and selecting which problems HVC should be used on.  Even where it is used,
different groups emphasize different steps of the Plan-Do-Check-Act cycle
(see Table 4-1).  Recently, Alan Mulally, the newly appointed president of
                                                
39 BCAG Operating Procedure Agreement 6-1000-183
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BCAG, stated that HVC implementation should be “pulled” by the airplane
programs, not “pushed” down on them, indicating that at least in the near term
its use will continue to be uneven.
4.2.1.2.1.1 The Build Tree
While other programs use HVC in pockets, 777 is its primary stronghold.  
HVC use within the 777 program is so ubiquitous that managing the data
associated with the many defined KCs became a serious concern.  The solution
chosen has been to integrate all the HVC airplane build information using the
Build Tree.  The Build Tree is a vehicle for explaining the customer-supplier
relationships among all the different tasks required to build an airplane.  These
tasks are referred to as Build Positions40 and the entire Build Tree motif is
described in the Build Position Standard Process Guide (the BPSP).  
Essentially, the Build Tree is a way of viewing the value chain for building an
airplane.
The BPSP has approximately 16 sections or chapters, presented here in Table
4-2.   Some of these sections are still being adjusted and new ones will likely
be added in the future.
                                                
40 BCAG and HABIT have a terminology problem that results in noticeable confusion and
misunderstanding (which often goes unresolved) from the terms “control code” and “build position”.
For decades, much of the discussion about managing the assembly of airplanes used the term “control
code” to describe a step in the assembly process.  The problem is that control codes were defined years
ago by the Finance department, not by an engineering group, as a tool for their work.  Build
positions, on the other hand, were defined comparatively recently and by engineering groups involved
in actual assembly operations.  Although a majority of the time control codes and build positions refer
to the same task, in many cases they do not.   
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1.   General Information
2.   Responsibility Matrix
3.   Communication Plan
4.   Process Flow Diagram
5.   Manufacturing Plan
6.   Tooling Plan
7.   Measurement Plan
8.   Tooling
9.   Process Acceptance Criteria
10. Process Acceptance Plan
11. Training and Certification Requirements
12. Measurement Data Collection
13. Process Improvement
14. Facilities Layout
15. 5S41 Plan
16. Total Productive Maintenance Plan
Table 4-2  The Sections Of The Build Position Standard Process Guide
Theoretically, every Build Position Owner will have all 16 sections completed
and online.  This is a critical enhancement of the build tree.  In paper form, the
large volume of information, everything from lists of contacts to engineering
models, is extremely difficult to navigate.  Electronic search and retrieval
capabilities are vital for increasing the usefulness and feasibility of the BPSP.
The BPSP is a guide for developing standard HVC processes.  The main idea
of the BPSP guide is to capture all the information needed to build a BCAG
airplane in a single, easily accessible location.  Essentially, it is a framework
for the Build Position Owners to use in defining their sections of the Build
Tree.  Every aircraft has its own Build Tree.  
4.2.1.2.1.2 HVCS
Implementing HVC has been a long, evolutionary process.  The current
information system used for HVC, HVCS (an acronym for HVC System)  is a
mainframe database of KC measurements with some SPC (Statistical Process
Control) analysis capabilities.
                                                
41 Sweeping, Sorting, Standardization, Simplification, and Self-Discipline
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HVCS’ status as a legacy application became clear with the rise of the Y2K
problem.  It is not Y2K compliant and would need significant revision to make
it so.  HVC’s legacy status was reaffirmed when the DCAC/MRM program, a
Tier-1 BCAG initiative, announced that the old paperwork system, called
Operations and Inspection Record or O&IR, on which HVCS depends to track
parts, would be replaced with a new one.  HVCS would not be able to support
its business processes much longer without major modifications.
In addition to being incompatible with DCAC/MRM and not Y2K compliant,
HVCS has other limitations:
• Data often must be entered manually from QA (Quality Assurance) sheets
from both internal and external suppliers
• Floppies of data are land mailed from suppliers and then manually
uploaded by BCAG engineers rather than directly transmitted to the
system from the suppliers.
• Datamytes, which store measurements as they are taken and then
automatically upload the data directly to the HVCS system, are available
and used only  sporadically in BCAG facilities
• It is difficult motivate personnel to collect the data, even within BCAG.
It is believed that simplifying or eliminating these problems would greatly
increase HVC’s use and implementation, and subsequently the quality of the
airplanes.
4.2.1.2.1.3 HVC Example:  777 Section 44 Body Panel Excess Length
Problem
This section presents an example of how HVC data has been used and why
the 777 program considers it essential for building quality airplanes.  The
material presented in this example is taken from Gayer’s 1998 Master’s thesis
which thoroughly documented how HVC is used by 777 to manage hardware
dimensional variation in practice.  Without going into unnecessary detail, 777
was repeatedly having a problem at FBJ (Final Body Join) where crown
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panels from section 44 were overlapping the panels of section 46 by 0.030 to
0.120 inches.42   Figure 4-3 gives an overview of how sections 44 and 46 fit
into the overall assembly.  Figure 4-4 illustrates the specific problem in section
44.
Figure 4-3  Airplane Requirements Overview
                                                
42 Gayer (1998), pp.27-44.
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Figure 4-4  Nominal And Actual Joins
This extra length on the crown panel led to major difficulties fitting the
sections together at the FBJ.  The diagram in Figure 4-5 illustrates the
symptoms of the problem and the work around solution of  trimming section
46.
Figure 4-5  Rework To Correct Section 44 Aft Crown Skin Protrusion
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The problem was thoroughly explored using the two measurement systems
already in place:  BCAG’s standard quality measurements for internal
production, called Quality Assurance or QA, and the HVC system.  QA
measurements are conducted by the Quality Assurance department and they
supersede HVC measurements; that is, a part is allowed to be used if it meets
QA measurements but not HVC measurements.  The reverse is not true.  The
two programs also do not take the same measurements.  QA has its own set of
measurements which may or may not coincide with the KC measurements
which are based on engineering drawings.
The problem was eventually traced to a supplier in Japan, Kawasaki Heavy
Industries or KHI, whose manually taken HVC measurements did not
correspond to the actual parts shipped.43  Figure 4-6 illustrates where and by
whom the HVC measurements were taken.
                                                
43 “Manually taken” measurements means that the measurements were taken, written down and then
typed into the system as opposed to being taken by an intelligent measurement tool that was uploaded
directly into the system.
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Figure 4-6  Section 44 Body Panel Station Index And Measurement Points44
The following tables present a sample of the HVC KC data from the problem
investigation.  Table 4-3 presents measurements taken by the Japanese
supplier, KHI, and submitted to Boeing.  
KHI Data For All 777s Manufactured Through December 1997
Left Side Panel Crown Panel Right Side Panel
Stringer 28L 24L 14L 14L 1L 1R 14R 14R 24R 28R
Mean 0.005 -0.003 0.006 -0.001 0.014 0.010 0.002 -0.010 -0.007 0.005
σ 0.008 0.010 0.008 0.014 0.012 0.014 0.011 0.015 0.017 0.014
Cp 1.725 1.352 1.590 0.968 1.104 0.962 1.193 0.917 0.799 0.978
Cpk 1.522 1.266 1.351 0.933 0.727 0.720 1.120 0.692 0.660 0.859
Table 4-3  Section 44 Aft Skin Edge KHI KC Data For All 777s Through
December 1997
Table 4-4 presents the measurements taken at the BCAG factory.
                                                
44 The abbreviation “CC335” stands for “Control Code 335” which indicates a measurement taken by
BCAG, not the supplier.
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CC335 KC Data For All 777s Manufactured Through June 1997
Left Side Panel Crown Panel Right Side Panel
Stringer 19L 14L 14L 1L 14R 14R 19R
Mean 0.076 0.044 0.066 0.059 0.060 0.061 0.077
σ 0.050 0.124 0.122 0.048 0.158 0.193 0.051
Cp 0.202 0.081 0.082 0.207 0.063 0.052 0.195
Cpk undefined undefined undefined undefined undefined undefined undefined
Table 4-4  Section 44 Aft Skin Edge Boeing CC335 KC Data For All 777s
Through June 1997
The italicized columns show measurements supposedly taken at the same
points.  A brief examination of the data shows that BCAG’s measurements of
the same KCs were significantly longer than those taken by the supplier.
Using the HVC system was a critical part of diagnosing the problem.  It also
shows why 777 regards HVC capability as being essential to the airplane
manufacturing process.
4.2.1.2.2 AQS
AQS is the variation control system BCAG’s external suppliers are held to.
The Advanced Quality System (AQS) and the Basic Quality System (BQS)
are both presented in a somewhat misnamed document “Advanced Quality
System D1-9000” published in 1989.  The focus of D1-9000 is defect
prevention rather than detection.  This is done by developing stable, reliable
manufacturing processes at BCAG’s external suppliers.  The document is
intended to be used as a guideline for external suppliers for certification that
their production processes are adequate for assuring quality.45
AQS was intended to provide suppliers with the tools needed to identify
improvement opportunities, reduce variation and implement reliable and
efficient processes.  The Procurement Quality Assurance group provides some
support to suppliers in developing AQS practices.  AQS requirements are
                                                
45 BCAG “General Operations Requirements Document for Suppliers - External/Internal
Suppliers/Program Partners”  D953W001 Rev D 1996 §3.1
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generally regarded as more stringent and demanding than the standards to
which BCAG’s internal suppliers are held.
D1-9000 was targeted largely at the executives of the external supplier base
because BCAG felt that only at that level could an environment that fostered
continuous quality improvement be created and maintained over the longer
term.46  AQS certification allows suppliers to reduce their part inspection
costs, thus providing a competitive bidding advantage.  This incentive, coupled
with the explicit contractual requirement, accounts for the general success and
widespread implementation of the AQS program in the BCAG supplier base.
4.2.1.2.3 THE HVC/AQS MERGER
It may be worth underscoring the point that BCAG has a great many separate
initiatives, all with the same basic goal:  to reduce costs while improving the
quality of the airplanes.  Realizing that having so many, perhaps redundant,
initiatives is inherently inefficient, an effort is underway to consolidate them
where appropriate.  The separate variation control standards for internal and
external production are an obvious choice for this effort and a team has been
created dedicated to merging HVC and AQS.  Another official document, the
D1-9011, is  being developed to establish a single standard governing activities
for both internal and external BCAG suppliers.
The HABIT project is owned by the group of senior managers charged with
implementing HVC/AQS.  One of the primary goals of the HVC/AQS team is
to:
Implement a seamless flowdown process from
programs to supplier-internal and external.47
 The HABIT system is considered a key tool for reaching that goal.
                                                
46 It is interesting to note that Boeing recognizes the need for top level support for quality initiatives
in its supplier base, but not necessarily in its own operations as documented in the HABIT case.
47 From D1-9011
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Figure 4-7  HABIT’s Position In The HVC/AQS Initiative48
Figure 4-7 gives an overview of the HVC/AQS organizational structure.  As
the figure shows, the HABIT project plays a major role in the overall
HVC/AQS initiative.
Besides the effort to merge HVC and AQS, BCAG also has a more general
Lean Manufacturing initiative.  It attempts to tie together even more of the
myriad quality improvement initiatives going on across BCAG:  HVC, 5S,
JIT, WCC, AQS, VSA, BQS, etc.49
4.2.1.3 777 And The HABIT Project
As was discussed earlier, 777 considers HVCS a mission critical application
for building quality aircraft.  HVCS, however, will soon no longer be able to
support existing business processes for two major reasons:
                                                
48 ISDS:  Information, Space, & Defense Systems
MR &D:  Manufacturing Research & Development
49 5S:  Sweeping, Sorting, Standardization, Simplification, and Self-Discipline
WCC:  World Class Competitiveness
VSA:  Variation Simulation Analysis
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• It is not Y2K compliant.
• The DCAC/MRM project, the BCAG-wide initiative aimed at re-
engineering the entire airplane manufacturing process, is eliminating the
paperwork that HVCS uses for tracking.50
Additionally, HVCS only implements steps 7 and 12 of the BPSP (see Table
4-2) while HABIT is planned to incorporate them all.  
Given this situation, 777 was faced with a choice:  upgrade its existing system,
HVCS, or replace it with a new one, HABIT.  Both options are expensive, but
HABIT appears to offer greater potential benefit.  Therefore, the 777 program
has chosen to lead the HABIT development effort and will be the first
program to implement the system.
4.2.1.4 Summary Of HABIT Background
In summary, the project started out as an idea for increasing quality and
efficiency by gathering all the tools and information needed to collect and
analyze HVC/AQS data in one system.  The decision to use the BPSP as the
framework of the application greatly increased its scope, which appears to be
slowing the development process.  Figure 4-8 illustrates the functionality
HABIT is intended to provide.  It will be the enabling tool for the
“HVC/AQS/DA/DFMA”51 bubble.  If fully implemented, its wide range of
functionality has the potential to benefit participants across the company.  
                                                
50 DCAC/MRM:  Define and Control Airplane Configuration and Manufacturing Resource
Management
51 DA:  Determinant Assembly
DFMA:  Design For Manufacturing/Assembly
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Figure 4-8  Major Elements of  HABIT’s Functionality
After several failed iterations the project has been reincarnated in the form
presented here.  It is intended to replace all the legacy databases that exist in
many hidden corners of BCAG.  To accomplish this goal, however, the project
would need more support from upper management than it is currently
receiving.
The project has a lot of history for a system which is yet to have its first
official release.  This implies that it may have a lot of underground or
background activity associated with it, invisible to many of its own internal
players much less to an outside researcher.  It also has relatively low top-level
recognition or support.  This is all happening against the backdrop of turmoil
and uncertainty due to layoffs and the Asian economic crisis that exists at
BCAG right now.
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4.2.2 PROJECT GOAL
This extensive background was presented to fully document the scope of the HABIT
charter:  to automate the HVC/AQS business process using the BPSP as the means to
organize all the information.  The system’s stated objective is as follows:
The purpose of HABIT is to provide a communication
tool that will improve the quality of our product, reduce
overall costs, improve cycle time and morale through
understanding how every person fits into making the
products we sell.  This tool will also serve as a single
source database for collected data and a link between
customers and suppliers.52
This objective requires active communication between everyone, not just BCAG
personnel, involved in creating the parts and assemblies for Boeing airplanes.
4.2.2.1 A Note On BCAG’s Project Management
Documentation
BCAG has an elaborate project management system (P+ documents) with
extensive documentation as part of the deliverable for each stage of system
development.  Each document must be approved by an array of interested
parties.  While writing the documentation may be time consuming, thorough
completion ensures that at least some of the key factors identified in Chapters
2 and 3 of this thesis would be addressed.  In some instances, however, these
documents either were never completed, were completed out of order and
hence lacking required information, or were not made available to involved
parties.  One of the primary goals of using the web as the basis of this system
is that it can make otherwise difficult-to-obtain information readily available.
Why this was not done for the documents most related to user needs is
puzzling and almost certainly negatively impacted perceptions of the project.
                                                
52 From Boeing HABIT Project “Objectives of the System”
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4.2.3 DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT
This section presents the project’s purpose, organization, and stakeholders.  The
system itself will be composed of several separate tools in addition to the databases
of measurement data and airplane build trees:  
• BTAT - Build Tree Authoring Tool.  This is the heart of the system.  All the
information captured in the BPSP for each Build Position will eventually reside
online through this utility.
• DCU - Data Collection Utility.  This allows either automated or manual entry of
HVC measurements to be taken on site and uploaded directly to the HABIT
database.
• Web-based BPSP.  Sections 1-16 implemented and web-accessible with varying
degrees of sophistication.
• SPC Charts.  Most SPC charting and analysis tools will be included in the initial
release with the remaining implemented in subsequent releases.
These tools will allow any data analysis or collection process to interface directly
with BCAG databases from anywhere in the world via the Internet.
While BCAG will require a significant investment in equipment, such as servers,
workstations, and data collection devices, the minimum requirements for a supplier to
use the system are quite reasonable:  a PC running Windows95 with access to the
Internet and a web browser (see Table 4-5).  This does not account for training and
maintenance costs, of course, but both of these expenses appear to be reasonable as
well.  These costs also compare very favorably with earlier IT requirements for
supplier integration: high maintenance, hard to learn UNIX workstations with
expensive CAD packages such as CATIA.
4.2.3.1 The Development Plan
Given the sheer volume of data and utility the system is intended to provide,
it almost goes without saying that the system will be released in several
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phases.  This section gives a high level description of the architecture and
plans for the initial release, currently expected to be in June of 1999.
4.2.3.1.1 ARCHITECTURE OVERVIEW
The HABIT developers have chosen to use commercially available off-the-
shelf software, often referred to as COTS software which stands for
Commercial-Off-The-Shelf software, to the extent possible.  This has two
benefits:  
• It minimizes the different areas of expertise the developers need to have by
exploiting work already done.
• It makes the system more portable to other environments that suppliers
might be using.  
Where needed, the developers have obtained permission to use applications
that are not part of Boeing’s internal IT standards.  Table 4-5 gives an
overview of the basic components of the system.
Architecture Component Description
Database Server: MS NT4.0 / SQL Server 6.5. Compaq Proliant w. 4
CPUs, minimum 512 MB RAM and 20GB hard drive
space.
Web Server: MS NT4.0 / Internet Information Server 3.0 w. ASP 2.0.
Compaq Proliant w. 4 CPUs, 512 MB RAM, 10GB hard
drive space.
Application Server: MS NT4.0 / MS Transaction Server 2.0 (shared w. above
server)
Generic Client: Any computer with a Web Browser supporting Java 1.1 and
HTML 3.2+. HABIT requires at least a Pentium 90 or
equivalent, w. 32 MB RAM or more, and a screen
resolution of 800 x 600 pixels or better.
Data Collection Client: Win32 PC (Win 95 or NT4.0), same hardware req. as
above, also needs to support laptops operating while
disconnected from network.
Build Tree Authoring Client: Win32 PC (Win 95 or NT4.0), same hardware req. as
above.
Languages: MS VC++ 5.0, and VB 5.0, Java 1.1, JavaScript
Communications
Infrastructure:
TCP/IP, HTTP, DCOM (server to server only), MSMQ
Support Applications: MS Exchange, Visio Professional 4.5, Boeing X500
database, Crystal Reports 6
Table 4-5  Overview Of HABIT Architectural Components
Figure 4-9 presents the general physical configuration of the system.
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Figure 4-9  Generic Physical Configuration Of HABIT
These standard approaches to architecture and platforms should encourage the
dissemination of the completed application to many levels of the supply
chain.  It also ensures that as maintenance and upgrades are needed in the
future, contractors who have experience with the underlying technologies
should be readily available.
4.2.3.1.2 SCOPE OF INITIAL RELEASE
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The initial release focuses on the Build Tree itself (the BTAT) as well as the
measurement plans, data collection, and analysis aspects of the BPSP.  The
remaining sections of the BPSP will have online, text field forms.  Minimal
functionality for exchanging images will be included.  None of these will be
interfaces with CAD tools or 3D modeling applications in the initial release.
Some, though not all, of the SPC analysis and charting capabilities will also be
included.  Even with this pared down scope, the undertaking is enormous.
Release 1.0 will also have limited interface capabilities with the internal Boeing
directory (Blues X-500), and Microsoft Exchange (Boeing’s internal email
package).  Interfaces with other systems will be addressed in later releases as
appropriate.
Suppliers will not be explicitly included in the initial implementation.  Once
Release 1.0 has been implemented and shown to be stable and effective within
BCAG, it will be piloted and then rolled out to suppliers.
4.2.3.1.3 LATER RELEASES
Incorporating Phase 1 response, Phase 2 will include more of the “bells and
whistles,” such as digital photography and manufacturing assembly
simulations.  It will also attempt to further integrate with other Boeing
systems.
One of the thornier technical issues is the exchange of engineering drawings and
models.  Since the key characteristics are defined on the engineering drawings,
being able to exchange these quickly and easily both internally and externally is
an important capability.  Unfortunately, it is also a very expensive one in
terms of the time and resources needed to implement it.  The lack of 3D
modeling support is also the primary sticking point for T-group53 buy in.  
                                                
53 The 747 and 767 airplane programs
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4.2.3.2 Stakeholders
The HABIT project is controlled by the HVC/AQS Senior Managers Steering
Committee which has representatives from across BCAG.  The HABIT
project organizational chart in Figure 4-10 shows the leadership structure of
the project:
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Figure 4-10  HABIT Development Project Organizational Structure
In addition to these, other groups also played significant roles during the case
study including:
• 777 HVC which is represented by 777 Process Engineering group.  This is
the first client for HABIT.  HVC is already considered an essential part of
building the airplane and therefore some system to support it must be in
place.
• 777 internal and external suppliers.
• T-Group HVC.  This is the next potential client on the list.  They are also
vacillating quite a bit on support and implementation.  HVC is not
ubiquitous in these programs.  Consequently, they face comparatively
much less pressure to implement HABIT.
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• BCAG Materiel.
Many other internal and external suppliers are potential candidates for the
system.  They and their specific requirements have not been identified,
however, in time to be included in the review of existing processes to develop
requirements.
One important observation about the stakeholders is that no top-level owner
from Boeing or BCAG is directly involved in the everyday project
management of the system.  This has resulted in a critical lack of funding,
leaving the system without the hardware needed for full development.  In
addition to lacking a clear top-level owner, it is not at all clear from the project
documentation who the specific customers of the project are expected to be.
This has led to some vacillation over what direction the project should take.
The lack of clarity about the most appropriate customers for HABIT, apart
from 777 which has already committed to use the system, remains an
immediate obstacle to the project’s further progress.
4.2.3.3 Risks Identified By The Project Documentation
The project management realized that the lack of guaranteed funding and the
growth in project scope that followed were serious threats to the timely
completion of the project.  In the Statement of Work for the first release of the
system the following “Critical Success Factors” were listed:
• Delays in obtaining resources such as systems and people.
• Changes to requirements, scope, and priorities.
• The worry of non release 1.0 activities delaying work on the first release.
• Availability of representatives from customer groups to define
requirements, and review documents or prototypes.
Support, in the form of allocation of testers from customer groups, purchase
of development and production equipment, and mandate for implementation is
needed badly but remains uncertain
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4.2.4 RESULTS
777 is under a great deal of pressure to ensure that HABIT is ready for production
and implemented by the end of the year.  As of the writing of this thesis, the project
has not had its initial in-house release.  The schedule has been pushed back several
times and the current expected completion date for initial release is June 11, 1999.
Long-term commitment from BCAG and airplane programs other than 777 is still in
question.  The project has suffered from understaffing for months and will likely
continue at somewhere around 50% of its planned-for headcount.  
In spite of these problems, support for the project is growing.  The Fabrication
division has announced plans to implement HABIT in the first quarter of 2000.
HABIT is expected to be the primary vehicle for communicating variability and
tolerancing data throughout the airplane manufacturing process.  The HABIT pilot
will serve as the communications vehicle for several other pilots as well, such as
Integrated Tolerance Analysis and Determinant Assembly.  It will also be used to
start disseminating information on other initiatives, such as the Factory Computing
Architecture effort.  The list of initiatives that plan on using HABIT’s extensive
communication abilities to disseminate documentation, training and any other needed
information is extensive.
4.2.5 HABIT KEY POINTS SUMMARY
The HABIT case study reveals the complicated dynamics underlying the
development of information systems for supplier integration.  The complexities and
uncertainties characterizing the dynamics of this environment are far greater than
those observed in the experimental projects.  The key points emerging from this
discussion are summarized below, organized in terms of process definition, system
definition, and business support.
4.2.5.1 Process Definition
The biggest problem the project faces is not the acceptance of HABIT, but
rather the acceptance of HVC, the business process HABIT implements and
facilitates.  By itself, the HVC process is quite well defined and articulated.
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HVC/AQS Senior Managers recognize the need for vocal support from upper
management to change this but are having difficulty securing it.
HVC process owners will admit that it is most useful in the engineering stage
of building an airplane.  Most of BCAG’s products, however, are already
engineered.  This forces the HVC managers to try to demonstrate the
usefulness of the approach on problems in manufacturing processes which are
farther downstream.  The consensus is that HVC works well in the Build Tree
but dies once on the factory floor.  A symptom of this problem is the
difficulty engineers have in getting factory personnel to take HVC
measurements.  Since the process is generally not considered essential to
building airplanes and the benefits of the HABIT system are somewhat
unclear, most programs feel no serious pressure to implement the system.
This resistance to the business process, which forms the conceptual
foundation of the system, makes process definition a very tricky task.  It has
contributed to the continuous revisions of the specific capabilities the system
is to provide.  The uncertainty caused by the constant shifting of requirements
and priorities threatens to throw the project so far off schedule it will never
see a production release.  The resistance to HVC has also contributed to the
reluctance of process owners to commit personnel to review and testing of
preliminary versions.  
At the same time so many programs are resisting HVC, other programs are
consolidating their efforts and becoming part of the HABIT effort.  This is
largely due to the funding pressures caused by the competition among
initiatives and BCAG’s growing emphasis on cost cutting.  Other initiatives
and systems are finding it appropriate to piggyback on HABIT’s
communication infrastructure, using it as the vehicle for their own systems.
While this has contributed to HABIT’s increasing scope problem, it is also a
sign that BCAG is starting to become more lean by consolidating the needed
communications systems.
Building Information Systems To Integrate The Manufacturing Supply Chain
80
Possibly due to the internal conflicts that are being faced, BCAG has basically
postponed considering how the new system will work with suppliers.  This
may also be due to the not unreasonable assumption that once the system can
deal with internal suppliers, modifying it for external suppliers will be much
easier.  
4.2.5.1.1 INFORMATION CONTROL ISSUES
The HABIT project managers have encountered strong internal resistance to
changing information control policies.  Though this is worse from some
corners than others, the Materiel division, which controls supplier contracts
and governs relationships to a large degree, is decidedly opposed to any
changes in the current information sharing policies.  Their primary reason for
this is that to legally change these policies, the contractual agreements with
each supplier would have to be re-negotiated, an extremely expensive and time
consuming undertaking for benefits that are not entirely clear to Materiel.
In spite of the legal problems, the technical design of the system supports
good information control.  The system itself has extensive security designed
into it.  In addition, the External Web Options Team, which controls outside
access to the Boeing internal web, has solid security measures in place to
protect Boeing information and systems.
4.2.5.2 System Definition
In general, the technical choices made by the development team appear to be
quite well thought out.  The system architecture is very appropriately
designed and developed despite the difficulties with obtaining firm functional
requirements.  Using Internet technologies, which provide extensive flexibility
and are relatively inexpensive, as the communications backbone the system
capitalizes on available COTS software as much as possible.  The applications
and platforms have been in compliance with Boeing’s internal IT standards.
This choice has several benefits:
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• It allows the developers to make the customizations needed and adjust to
the challenges of the changing requirements relatively easily.  
• It creates a system that is compatible with other applications being
developed within Boeing, allowing them to utilize HABIT’s infrastructure
rather than having to create their own.  This is a very efficient use of the
infrastructure.
• It makes maintenance and portability much simpler and cheaper than a
fully proprietary system would be.
The most serious technical difficulty encountered so far is developing the
interface to the CAD systems and 3D engineering models.  Even this,
however, could be dealt with effectively if the project had sufficient people,
time, and money.
4.2.5.3 Business Support
Lack of assured, sufficient funding is the HABIT project’s biggest concern.
Given the system’s initial ambitious scope, a major financial commitment is
needed to bring it to completion.  Many groups within BCAG have not found
the business case for HVC entirely convincing.  Savings from the program exist
and are real but are not widely known, perhaps because they are lost in the din
of other initiatives vying for management support.  Since such support has not
been forthcoming from the highest levels of BCAG, the project has been
forced to seek what support it can from individual programs and other
projects.  This has led to increasing the scope of the project, requiring more
money and personnel to develop it.  Unfortunately, the project is already
significantly understaffed for the amount of work needed to be done in the
remaining time in the schedule.
Initiative competition is a huge problem for every non-Tier 1 effort within
BCAG.  The multitude of initiatives, many of them redundant, is very
expensive for BCAG in terms of money, time, and other resource
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expenditures, yet many of these programs are inadequately supported for
reaching their goals.  
One of the problems caused by having so many initiatives with wavering
commitments from upper management, aside from the obvious waste and
inefficiency, is that BCAG does not present a unified front to its external
suppliers or customers.  How the HABIT system can be used to present a
more consistent face to suppliers, possibly by integrating with other
initiatives, needs further exploration.  
To a certain extent, this is occurring naturally as other small programs,
Geometric Design & Tolerancing, and Valysis for example, piggyback on
HABIT’s communication infrastructure.  This consolidation of different
programs on to one communications infrastructure is a sign of BCAG’s move
towards becoming a lean enterprise.  Whether this is planned or merely the
result of the company’s current financial pressures is difficult to determine.
Oddly, BCAG recognized in planning its AQS program that the D1-9000
should be targeted at upper management as the most effective path to
successful implementation.  Yet BCAG itself is awash in programs and
initiatives aimed at improving quality in one way or another with little or no
upper management support or guidance.
4.3 Summary Of Key Points In Production Systems
This chapter has shown that the issues involved in developing production information
systems for supplier integration are extremely complex.  No single “best practice” has
emerged for dealing with them all.  This section identifies the key points from both
systems.
Both HABIT and Electronic Commerce With Suppliers have invested considerable
effort in defining up-front the processes the information systems facilitate.  This
practice appears to work well as far as it goes, but as the HABIT situation shows,
more than just articulating the process requirements is needed.  Consensus must exist
among all the participants that the processes being defined should be used and
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implemented.  If this consensus does not exist, the participants will not be well
motivated to invest the effort needed to develop and implement an effective
information system.
Competition with other internal initiatives for funding and support also proved to be
an obstacle to both systems.  Reducing the number of redundant initiatives and
integrating their worthwhile ideas into everyday practices should be a goal of any lean
enterprise.  The fractured and disjointed interaction with external organizations, be
they customers or suppliers, is costly and detrimental to the company.  The key to
addressing this issue is consolidating information systems and quality programs to
present a unified front and gain maximum utilization from communications
infrastructure investments.
Also affected by the competition among internal initiatives is the lack of sufficient
funding for these information systems projects.  A certain minimum investment is
required just to purchase the tools and expertise needed to begin development on an
information systems project.  Because the HABIT system involved the development
of a large system with an extensive infrastructure, the initial capital needs are much
more pronounced than with Electronic Commerce With Suppliers.  LMA’s approach
works around this issue by only spending enough up-front to build the prototype,
leaving the heavy implementation funding issues to the individual programs.  With
BCAG’s much larger system, this is not a feasible approach.  The notion of viewing
information technology expenditures as investments in future viability and
competitiveness has not yet caught on.
Interestingly, BCAG recognizes the need for top-level up-front commitment from
upper management to quality improvement and supplier integration initiatives within
its supplier base, yet it is not implementing these ideas within its own company.
Both companies also see the value in using common software applications and
platforms as much as possible.  Choosing common, open technologies, such as the
Internet communication protocols, maximizes the number of potential participants by
assuring that the equipment needed is minimal yet sufficient for the task.  This also
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ensures that the systems developed are within the information technology plans and
strategies of most companies.
LMA took a more flexible approach in general than did BCAG, particularly in the area
of supplier relationships.  Lockheed Martin intended the project specifically for
communicating with suppliers and addresses the individual needs of any program’s
particular suppliers separately.  Creative funding ideas, such as using LMA’s
purchasing power to obtain equipment for suppliers at a discount, facilitate supplier
use and involvement, a cornerstone of supplier integration.  BCAG assumes its
suppliers will participate in the HABIT system, but has done little to explicitly
address the attendant issues.  Focusing on the immediate in-house needs is both easier
in the present and may resolve many issues before the system leaves BCAG’s full
control.  It may be, however, that critical issues for the supplier base that could be
resolved now if they were explored will not be found until much later when they will
be very costly, if not impossible, to fix.
The approach both companies have taken on information control policies mirrors how
they are approaching suppliers in other areas.  LMA recognizes that it must be
flexible on these issues, in part because their suppliers own the intellectual property
rights to some of the parts they build.  BCAG, on the other hand, refuses to consider
any changes to existing agreements to avoid having to re-open contract negotiations
with any or all of its thousands of suppliers.  Though the logic behind BCAG’s
position is understandable, the position seriously inhibits the likelihood that BCAG
will ever fully realize the benefits of supplier integration.
The fact that most of the impetus for developing the HABIT system comes from the
777 program, which has a much more progressive approach to its suppliers, while
other programs are resisting it raises an interesting point.  Is it necessary for a prime
to have a good relationship, that is, a partnering relationship, with its suppliers before
such an information systems project can be successfully undertaken?  One of the
goals for developing methods to build information systems for supplier integration is
to help more manufacturers develop closer relationships with their suppliers.  If that
close relationship must exist before the information systems project can be
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successfully undertaken, much of the research done to date will be ineffective because
the implicit assumption is that open and useful communication channels already exist
between the manufacturer and supplier.  This becomes a “chicken and egg” problem:
information systems are needed to allow closer relationships between members of the
supply chain, but close relationships are a prerequisite for building the information
system itself.  Strategies for bridging this gap, such as concurrent system and
relationship development, warrant further investigation.
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5 KEY FACTORS ANALYSIS
This chapter examines how the key enablers identified from existing research, as well
as those identified from the two experimental projects examined earlier, address the
issues, problems and needs associated with the actual production projects discussed
in Chapter 4.  The purpose of this analysis is to identify the gaps requiring more
specific attention to major factors, enablers, and mitigation strategies to facilitate and
encourage the development of systems that integrate suppliers and manufacturers.
Where appropriate, potential strategies and actions are suggested for project owners.
The key points from Chapters 2 and 3 are  summarized below in Table 5-1 to serve as
the framework for this analysis.
Process Definition
• Problem recognition:  Identify problem and related process owners including those at
external suppliers
• Evaluation and synthesis:  Clearly define existing internal and external processes and the
modified or new processes that the proposed system will support
• Determine what user training for their role in supplier integration will be needed
• Determine what information sharing policies will need to be changed
• Specification: Define the exact functionality the system will provide to support these
processes
• Review
System Definition
• Select architecture to implement the functional specification including all internal and
external supplier or customer links
• Choose a common platform and suite of applications
• Ensure security is easy to implement quickly
• Choose  the common  network infrastructure, such as the Internet
• Determine legacy system strategy  for all systems which will be involved
Feasibility Assessment
• Assess  alignment with business strategy of prime and key suppliers involved
• Assess  alignment with information technology strategy
• Analyze the costs and benefits of the proposed system for the prime and key suppliers
 
Table 5-1  Summary of Key Factors
The following is a point-by-point examination of these inferred strategies and actions
from the perspective of the production systems examined.
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5.1 Process Definition
Overall, careful attention to process definition was strongly emphasized in the
“experimental” project and this was found to be just as important in the “production”
cases examined in this thesis.  The importance of specific elements of the defining the
processes, however, varied somewhat between production and experimental projects,
as well as between the two production projects that have been examined.
One key issue that has emerged from the process definition activities in connection
with the projects considered in this thesis is that when developing an information
system for supplier collaboration, it is tremendously helpful to have close
relationships between the manufacturer and its suppliers.  IT systems are complex
products, requiring technical, legal, and organizational information and cooperation
from all the participants.  In much the same way a close manufacturer-supplier
relationship has been shown to foster more efficient product development, a close
relationship is also very helpful, perhaps essential, to collaborative information
systems development.
5.1.1 PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION
Neither production project had difficulty identifying the problem to be fixed.
Identifying the specific causes of the problem was somewhat more difficult.  BCAG,
in particular, has had some difficulty in constraining the scope of the problem.
Whether this is truly the nature of the hardware variation problem, a flaw in defining
the relevant processes, or an unavoidable symptom of BCAG’s internal bureaucracy
is difficult to assess with certainty.  
It is unreasonable to expect any computer system to solve all of the problems
involved in manufacturing complex products.  Though any given problem in the
manufacturing process may have significant impacts on many other areas, this does
not imply that one system must solve them all.  Finding a methodology to
appropriately bound the problem and limit scope-creep to within the feasible limits of
an information system would be useful in this case.
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This issue is considerably more complicated when the source of the problem involves
an outside supplier.  In some companies, the minimal requirements for discussing
problems with suppliers, such as knowing the names and telephone numbers of the
personnel involved, are strictly controlled making the free exchange of ideas difficult.
Identifying clear points of contact and encouraging closer association of people with
decision making authority and responsibility will facilitate identifying the causes of
the problem.  This simple gathering of involved parties is a critical, yet often very
difficult, step in the system development process.
5.1.2 EVALUATION
Evaluating the relevant business processes and how they would work with the new
system was invaluable to the Lockheed Martin project.  LMA found unexpected
benefits from this step, in the form of new, non-IT process improvements, for merely
the cost of the process owner’s time and participation in planning meetings.  
BCAG also found this activity to be important and devoted considerable resources to
it.  Despite this resource commitment, BCAG’s efforts may not have been sufficient.
The problem with the HABIT system is that the business processes the system will
facilitate, HVC, are not entirely accepted by the internal BCAG community.  This
leaves the HABIT project in one of two possible states.  The first is that widespread
prior acceptance of HVC is not necessarily a requirement for HABIT’s eventual
success and the system can in fact be used as a tool for fostering such acceptance.
The other situation is that wide scale HVC acceptance is a true prerequisite for
system development and without it the system itself will not be successfully
developed and implemented.  Which of these is actually the situation at BCAG can
not be determined at this time.  
Implementation of a gradual change management plan might be an appropriate answer
to this lack of process acceptance.  By recognizing that HVC is not fully accepted as a
business process and by clearly mapping a reasonable path for implementing it that
addresses everyone’s serious concerns, the transition may be smoother and may
therefore meet lower levels of resistance.  This could only occur, however, if BCAG’s
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upper management makes a full, unequivocal, commitment to the implementation of
the HVC process company wide.
Apart from the HVC process acceptance issue, BCAG’s external suppliers have
barely been involved in this discussion at all.  Most of them, however, have already or
are in the process of implementing AQS techniques, which implies that they have at
least accepted the underlying process the system will support.
5.1.2.1 Information Control
LMA has an open and accommodating approach in this area due to the
constraint that many of its suppliers own the intellectual property rights to
the parts they produce.  While security is a critical concern, the flexible
approach to the unique intellectual property rights issues of each situation
was key to developing an effective system.
BCAG has chosen to take a more hands-off approach, assuming that existing
information control policies would suffice for the newly defined and IT-
enabled processes.  This may be partly due to the general perception of lack of
trust between BCAG and its suppliers, and partly due to BCAG’s reticence
to incur the cost of re-negotiating its suppliers’ contracts.  This attitude is
counter to one of the primary goals of building such systems:  fostering closer
relationships between primes and their suppliers.  This issue reflects the fact
that BCAG has central control of most issues related to external interactions.
Whether this is a viable model for the long term future of the company is
questionable.  At a minimum, the information control issue needs to be
addressed as contracts expire.
The differences in these two approaches raises a critical question:  Is it
necessary for a manufacturer and supplier to have a partnering relationship
before building an information system to facilitate supplier collaboration?  Can
the information system be built first and effectively encourage a closer
relationship?  Although the evidence here is not conclusive, it suggests that if
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the partnering relationship comes first, the system development project will
be much more successful.
5.1.2.2 Training And Support
Both LMA and BCAG appear to have devoted adequate resources to
addressing their in-house training needs.  Relatively little emphasis has been
placed on considering supplier training needs during system development.
While the web-based technologies with user-friendly interfaces may be easier
to learn than older systems, it is still quite likely that many suppliers’
employees will have had considerably less experience with these technologies
than those at the prime manufacturer.  
BCAG has made a fortuitous choice in developing computer based training for
HABIT that is accessible via the Internet.  Assuming a user at a supplier has
the knowledge needed to navigate the web and use a PC, they will be able to
make use of BCAG’s online training.  This should help control training costs
for both BCAG and the supplier.
Neither system has devoted much explicit attention to examining on-going
support costs, either for themselves or their suppliers.  Although these should
be fairly low for a supplier with a minimum installation, just the monthly
charge on the phone line and occasional system maintenance, it may be
considerable for the primes which will need high speed connections, extensive
database administration, and system maintenance, among other expenses.  
It should be noted that these observations are based on the experiences of
system testers and project documentation.  Without production releases to the
supplier base, it is impossible to say with certainty that training and support
needs were adequately addressed.
5.1.3 SPECIFICATION AND REVIEW
The process definition and functional specification stages of the system development
process  have been well handled in both the production cases examined in this thesis.
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The importance of having clearly defined requirements is well appreciated by  the
teams in both companies.  Both projects developed adequate specifications overall
and have built the review process into the development process.
5.2 System Definition
Although both production systems certainly had technical challenges, neither
encountered problems that were intractable from a purely technical standpoint.  Both
made appropriate use of COTS software packages for maximum efficiency and
portability.
5.2.1 ARCHITECTURE
The HABIT project used a client/server based architecture not unlike those used by
the experimental systems.  The architecture BCAG chose exploits existing, COTS
capabilities, customizing only where actually needed.  They also chose well in using
the web browser interface to the system, encouraging extensive supplier use with
minimal equipment and training costs.  This observation has serious ramifications for
future projects as a good, possibly better, alternative to the current thinking that to
achieve meaningful communication all sites must have identical platforms and
applications.  From the supplier’s viewpoint, the less costly web-browser approach
is much more inclusive.
5.2.1.1 Communications Infrastructure
Choosing the technology for the global architecture and then addressing how to
apply it at a local level is much more effective than choosing the local
architecture first and then trying to scale up.  Both production projects
implemented this approach.  Both production systems chose Internet
technologies and communication protocols, if not the Internet itself, as their
communications backbone.  This decision also stems from the fact that these
technologies are inherently flexible and widely available.  Most development
tools have facilities for creating systems  based on Internet technology.  It
allows for maximum connectivity by organizations both external and internal
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to the manufacturer  at relatively low cost.  The widespread use of these
technologies ensures that support for them will continue for the foreseeable
future.  These factors make this choice low risk and high reward.
5.2.1.2 Common Platform And Application Suite
Installing common applications on common platforms is the simplest way to
ensure compatibility and was strongly emphasized by the experimental
systems.  When these applications are sophisticated CAD tools on high end
workstations, it can also be extremely costly, particularly for a smaller
supplier with limited internal IT budget and multiple clients, each with its own
IT standards.  
LMA chose to use this approach but with some room for flexibility in the
implementation.  It also used the strength of its buying power to ease the
burden on suppliers where possible.
BCAG, on the other hand, chose to develop a system that could, in theory,
interface with any CAD system.  The information could then be presented to
the user via a web browser, reducing the need to have an installation of every
CAD package a customer could use at the supplier.  This seems to be a more
cost effective approach than installing read only versions of high end CAD
systems on the factory floor.
5.2.1.3 Security Implementation
Security is a major concern  for every project.  For the most part, however,
existing security measures, if consistently and thoughtfully applied, appear to
be more than adequate for restricting access to information.  Boeing is an
excellent example of thorough security implementations.  The HABIT system
by itself has strong security measures built in which requires each user to have
their own account and password, and even then restricts outside access to
only their own data, and the build positions directly above and below them.
Before an outsider can even reach the HABIT system, however, they must
pass through Boeing’s universal network security measures.  All access to
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Boeing’s internal web from the outside is strictly controlled and monitored by
the External Web Options Team (EWOT), which has an impressive command
of its capabilities and responsibilities to the company and its various
organizations.  An extensive series of firewalls must be traversed with multiple
accounts and passwords in order for an outside user to get to Boeing internal
systems.  
As with any system, the key to security for all these systems is an educated
and trustworthy workforce.  The most serious threats come not from
malicious outsiders marauding on the Internet, but from disgruntled internal
employees or former employees well versed in the company’s security
measures and systems.  This implies that to allow a supplier access to internal
systems means trusting the supplier’s employees as much as a manufacturer
trusts its own.  Again, this is something more likely to happen between
companies which already have established a partnering relationship and have
developed a high degree of trust in each other’s security measures and
personnel.
5.2.2 LEGACY SYSTEMS INTEGRATION
The legacy systems discussion begins in the process definition stage.  The resolution
is not determined until the system is defined from a technical standpoint.  This allows
the developers to gather all the information needed about the role and value of these
systems in the existing environment and how that should be modified or integrated
with the new system and processes.  
Both BCAG and LMA dealt sufficiently well with their legacies.  It is a key part of
the decisions made by the communications IPT Lockheed Martin uses.  It is also
explicitly addressed by the decisions made  for the BCAG HABIT project.  As in
most cases, integration or gradual migration to a new systems was the best option.
In BCAG’s case, the legacy system problem is the critical driving force in the project.
This has become a common phenomenon.  While this can be a useful tool for a project
manager if properly leveraged, it forces the project to move ahead whether progress is
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warranted or not.  The risk that a critical decision will be poorly made due to time
pressures is much greater in such a situation.  This does not yet appear to be a
problem for the BCAG project but that may change as the approach of December 31,
1999 increases the pressure on the schedule.
5.3 Feasibility
Assessing the feasibility of the project, both in the initial planning and as the
development progresses, is the most difficult step for production systems and is also
the least well addressed by the research and experiments.  The tools for measuring the
value of these systems, and supplier integration in general, are not sufficiently mature.
Accurately predicting how the system will or should be used and what value it will
add to the product often seems to be more akin fortunetelling than business
management.  Yet project managers must thoroughly address these issues and
communicate them to upper management to gain sufficient support for the project.
The most significant problem the two projects had in common has been and continues
to be securing sufficient initial funding.  The three major areas of the feasibility
assessment which included alignment with business strategy, conformance to IT
standards, and favorable cost-benefit ratios, though important, do not appear to be
entirely sufficient to resolve this issue.  This is particularly true for larger project
commitments.  LMA’s approach of building multiple smaller systems has the
advantage in that their lower individual expenses can be more easily justified.  BCAG,
on the other hand, is building a large system by promising potential financial
supporters that meeting their needs will be a priority for the system.  Both projects
would benefit from clearer and more accurate methods to predict cost savings and
other benefits from proposed systems.  Strategies for predicting and sharing costs
among all participants in the system would make business cases for the projects more
convincing.
5.3.1 BUSINESS STRATEGY ALIGNMENT
Alignment with business strategy must be considered on many levels, a fact that
should be more strongly made in future research.  At a very high level, the system
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should clearly support the mission of the company.  In BCAG’s case, for example,
their mission is to build better airplanes more efficiently and the HABIT system
certainly does this.  
Most large companies have a more detailed strategy for doing business than this, and
if they do not, they probably should.  In BCAG’s case, the strategy focuses on
improving quality and efficiency by reducing part variation.  This is accomplished by
guaranteeing that the processes used to make the parts are stable and accurate, that is,
they always produce parts that are within tolerances.  This should improve efficiency
in two important ways:
• Preventing the manufacture of  out of tolerance parts.
• Eliminating the need to measure every part to know that it is within tolerance.
Implementing these stable and reliable processes, however, is neither cheap nor easy.
Some personnel in various corners of the Boeing Company still believe that it is
cheaper, and therefore better, to make half the parts wrong and make twice as many of
them than it is to make all the parts right and only as many as needed.  
The HABIT system is congruent with the long range goal of encouraging the
development of stable processes both within BCAG and at its suppliers.  The fact
that the long range business strategy of using stable processes to build good parts has
not been fully accepted by all the different programs and groups within BCAG,
however, is a constant source of friction.  It is unreasonable to expect an IT system to
solve this problem, or even be successfully implemented in this environment.  To the
extent that HABIT can support the company’s official long range strategy, it does.
While the fact that the company has not fully aligned its other processes with that
long range strategy may prove crippling to both the system and the company, it is a
problem that is beyond the authority of the HABIT project managers to resolve.
On another level of business strategy, HABIT also supports BCAG’s long range
plans to become more lean.  The competition among various redundant or partially
overlapping initiatives and quality control efforts in both LMA and BCAG
significantly impacted the development of both projects.  While this may be
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symptomatic of larger problems, it is beyond the scope of this thesis, and the projects
being discussed here, to solve them.  BCAG is slowly recognizing that having
redundant initiatives is wasteful and inefficient.  By building an information system
that can incorporate the functionality of other systems, some of this redundancy can
be reduced, moving BCAG closer to becoming a lean enterprise.
One of the problems with the business strategic alignment issue, however, is that
unless a top-level company official is directly involved in the project planning, it can
be difficult to tell with certainty what the long term strategy for the company is.
Sifting through the colossal volume of regulations, operating procedures, memos, and
manuals that BCAG publishes internally to discern long range strategic business plans
is an onerous task for time-constrained project managers.  BCAG is recognizing the
need to streamline its internal quality initiatives; its internal publications are in need of
similar attention.
The issue of business strategy alignment becomes much more complicated when the
system requires the cooperation of outside companies.  In much the same way
contractual agreements must be designed to support the business goals of all parties,
the information systems development project should fit with the business strategies
of all the participants.  LMA, having a more cooperative and flexible attitude towards
its suppliers initially, made accommodating their interests and needs a key part of the
project planning and development.  If the systems could not be modified to work
satisfactorily for a program’s key supplier, the system was not implemented.  This
flexibility in the approach to suppliers is an essential enabling factor for LMA, and it
is certainly helping 777 to move HABIT development along.  The lack of it, on the
other hand, appears to be hindering other BCAG airplane programs as the company
increases pressure to reduce waste and improve quality.
5.3.2 INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY PLAN ALIGNMENT
In much the same way the processes an information systems project facilitates should
be in accordance with the company’s business strategy, its technical aspects should
be in compliance with its information technology plan.  This implies that the
Building Information Systems To Integrate The Manufacturing Supply Chain
98
information technology plan must be appropriate for implementing the long range
business strategy.  Alignment between the two is accomplished by having and
enforcing requirements that are strict enough to minimize conflicts between different
versions of standard applications, yet flexible enough to allow new technologies  to be
investigated and exceptions to corporate standards made where needed.
A key problem in this area is the view held by upper management in many companies
that IT is entirely overhead, an unavoidable expense that should be minimized
wherever possible.  This tends to limit the flexibility of the information technology
plan and has a withering effect on the development of potentially revolutionary new
information systems.  Though this attitude is changing as many industries are
revolutionized by well applied information technology, as in Amazon.com’s
revolution of the retail book industry for example, it still persists in many corners.
Both HABIT and Electronic Commerce With Suppliers are managing to work within
the limits of their corporate IT standards.  Where necessary, they have so far been
able to obtain waivers from corporate standards.  LMA also seems to be successful in
adapting its systems to the requirements of its suppliers in large part due to its overall
cooperative approach.  
The research finding that all participants use identical systems is well based given the
enormous problems with compatibility that can exist even between different versions
of the same CAD package.  The high cost of this approach makes it infeasible for
most suppliers, however.  Though Northrop Grumman is a very large corporation
that can afford to install and support multiple CAD packages to maximize technical
communication with its customers, doing so would soon result in a chaotic morass of
different systems each requiring its own expert support.  Such an approach is not
feasible on a large scale for supplier integration.  This approach is even more infeasible
for smaller suppliers who lack the in-house IT support staff of a large company.
The use of COTS applications that operate equivalently on many different platforms
seems to be the most viable approach to this problem available at this time.  It
maximizes compatibility, minimizes the need for time consuming and data destroying
translation, and reduces the costs for suppliers to multiple customers.  
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BCAG took this a step further by developing an in-house system based on its own
choice of COTS applications, but designing it such that any supplier with a minimal
IT investment can reap significant benefits from using it.  Developing their own
software for their somewhat unique market position is not an unreasonable choice for
BCAG.
5.3.3 COSTS AND BENEFITS
The issue of determining specific costs and benefits has already been touched on from
various directions in this analysis.  This is the fundamental issue on which all the
decisions for the project, and the company, must be made.  
The costs are at least somewhat predictable.  Moore’s law has proven accurate for
several decades and is not likely to change  in the immediate future.  Creative use of a
large company’s market power, as LMA chose to do, can also substantially control
costs for both the prime and the supplier.  Unforeseen issues, such as schedule slips
or difficulty obtaining needed equipment, can significantly add to predicted costs,
however.
Predicting the benefits of these systems is far more problematic.  This is due, in part,
to the difficulty in quantifying the benefits of supplier integration or presenting a
unified face to outsiders.  It is also due to the mercurial nature of information
technology implementations in the face of fast-paced technological changes.
Predicting the business ramifications of communicating huge amounts of tremendously
complex information many orders of magnitude faster than has ever been done before
in an industry is prophesying at best.
The risks posed by this problem are twofold.  The company that invests in
information technology and tries to build the revolutionary new system may spend
huge amounts of time and money for virtually no reward.  On the other hand, the
company that fails to exploit new technologies risks being surpassed by fundamental
changes controlled by competitors that can occur with dizzying swiftness.  
One way of handling this issue is to begin identifying specific, measurable goals, such
as a certain amount of time or cost savings, for the system in the early problem
Building Information Systems To Integrate The Manufacturing Supply Chain
100
identification phase.  These should be reviewed and updated as part of the process
and system definition stages.  Having more easily defined and understood benefits as
part of the business case will reduce resistance even if the system’s primary focus is
on improving supplier collaboration, something much less easily measured.
5.4 Summary
Several areas have emerged from this analysis as serious issues future research should
address.
The notion that system and data compatibility is best achieved by investing in
identical systems for all participants has been seriously challenged.  Using inexpensive
technologies that allow the viewing of data from the more expensive systems is a more
cost effective approach for most situations.  This requires a much smaller investment
in the high end systems yet still allows full visibility and avoids data translation and
corruption.
Lack of business process acceptance before the system planning begins is a real issue
in production situations.  The lack of tools and models to accurately predict and
measure the benefits of system goals such as supplier integration or consistent
external interfaces are seriously hampering projects.  
Both of these are part of the larger question of whether a prime must already have a
close relationship with its suppliers before a collaborative IT system can be
successfully developed, or whether the relationship can be developed concurrently
with or even after the system is implemented.  The level of trust and flexibility needed
to develop and use such a system suggests that perhaps the partnering relationship
must already exist.  The act of developing  a system to exchange sensitive proprietary
information requires a tremendous amount of trust and cooperation, as much as the
act of collaborating across companies on new product designs.  Initiating the
development of trust and flexibility, however, is often harder than developing the
system.  Starting with small efforts at cooperation and building on those successes
appears to be the most realistic approach.  This sets the precedent for closer
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communication among all manufacturing process owners, encouraging the
development of systems to improve that communication.
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6 CONCLUSIONS
This chapter summarizes the key points of the thesis.  It summarizes the differences
between  experiment and production environments and identifies areas that
experiment and research omitted.  It examines the policy issues raised by this research
and suggests areas for further exploration.
6.1 Key Issues
Analysis of the data gathered shows that the major issues not addressed stem from
factors that are typically not dealt with in the experiments.  Table 6-1 presents some
of the differences between production and experimental environments, such as the fact
that problems that are not well understood or that management does not actively
support investigating are not chosen for the experiments.  Since those who run the
experiments are confident of their funding source and can clearly define the
manufacturing issue to be solved, all their efforts can be organized and focused around
the technical implementation issue.  Managers of production efforts do not have these
luxuries and often find their efforts divided among constantly trying to find financial
support and learning the intricacies of the manufacturing processes while development
is underway.
Experimental Production
Cost of failure (risk) None - lessons either way Very significant
Upper management support Implicit Frequently not until late in
development
Problem Definition Clarified before the project
starts
Often done concurrently with
development; scope creep
Funding Source Outside the project itself (NFP,
government, military, research)
Internal to the company
managing the development
Funding Minimum Guaranteed before the project
starts
Seldom guaranteed until the
money changes hands
Scope Small Huge
Other Sense of doing “cutting edge”
work
Viewed as back office (less
glamorous) work
Table 6-1  Differences Between Experimental And Production Environments
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While the experimental cases did provide valuable information on technical needs,
they failed to emphasize the critical importance of the non-technical issues such as
initiative competition and project support.
The processes involved in the production environment are far more numerous and
have much more complicated inter-relationships than those chosen for experiments.
The uncertainty of source of funding contributes further instability to these already
complicated matters.  Table 6-2 presents some of these issues.
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Key Factor Production Issues
Process Definition • Process acceptance should happen first  and a
change management plan should be in place if
needed.
• Close supplier relationships greatly facilitate
every step of development.
Problem Identification • Must limit to feasible scope.
• Identify specific goals and metrics to make the
business case.
Information Control • Needs to be honestly addressed by all involved
parties in the very early stages.
Training and Support • Both probably need better estimates and
attention.
Specification • Adequate.
Review • Continuous.
System Definition • Cost-effective choices, such as data that can be
viewed using a web browser, appear to have a
profoundly inclusive effect
• Still some technical limitations (e.g., 3D
engineering models very resource intensive)
Communications Infrastructure • Open, flexible technologies are adequate.
Common Platform & Application Suite • Lower costs solutions that do not require
extensive investment and training by suppliers
preferable.
• COTS software packages reduce the amount of
redundant work done and allow multiple
applications to be used.
Legacy Systems • Gradual integration and migration key.
Security • Systems have adequate security measures.  Far
more attention is needed to ensuring they are well
used in the daily business processes.
• The 128-bit encryption export ban increases
complexity and risk when international suppliers
are involved.
Feasibility • Though important, the following three elements
are not sufficient for assessing feasibility.
Business Strategy • Many different levels.  Unclear where the system
should focus its attention.
IT Plan • Assuming this is congruent with a well thought
out business plan, this is not difficult.  Creating
a viable IT plan, however, is not easy.
Cost-Benefit • Very difficult.  Measuring the benefits of supplier
integration or unifying the company’s face to its
suppliers is very difficult.
• Defining easily understood benefits in the
problem identification phase, even if they are
side-effects of the true goal of the system, will
facilitate the business case given that the above
described benefits are hard to envision before they
occur.
Table 6-2  Production Project Issues
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The fact that the concept of supplier integration is still new for many manufacturers
needs to be remembered when planning these projects.  In many cases, both the
business processes and the systems to support them are being developed at the same
time and few people have a clear notion of how they are going to work together.  The
sanitized world of research and testbeds does not truly account for the difficulties of
this very complex and dynamic environment.
6.2 Policy Implications
The widespread development of information systems that allow close collaboration
on complex technical issues between a manufacturer and remote supplier raises several
public policy issues.
First, because the investment required in building information systems fostering
collaboration with suppliers is typically quite high for both manufacturer and
supplier, manufacturers are likely to shift more of their work to a few key suppliers
who have implemented these systems and processes.  This could tend to reduce the
supplier base of the industry.  The results of this are a loss of competition and a loss
of jobs.
The loss of jobs, particularly from the closing of American companies, is a national
concern both for the economic impact it will have and the threat to security it poses.
If the high level of technical expertise needed in the manufacture of complex products,
such as in the aerospace industry, resides entirely with a foreign company, it may not
be available in times of war even if the country it resides in is not directly hostile to
the United States.
Another serious wartime concern is that extensive communication links with overseas
suppliers pose a security risk.  Access to American systems can not be fully
controlled and restricted without physically severing the connection between
companies.  If the production processes of the manufacturer are dependent on the
communication and product of foreign suppliers, the entire production manufacturing
process is at risk in a crisis.
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Aside from the national security and economic concerns, these systems and business
processes evolving with them present unique challenges for the legal system.
Extensive and instantaneous access to the data of a company that might be a supplier
in one area, but a competitor in another opens up many possibilities for abuse.  
These include corporate espionage or collusion.  Detecting these transgressions in a
timely fashion is even more difficult.  Federal wiretap laws were not developed with
the intent of monitoring data transmissions.  The government currently has no means
of reading encrypted information if illegal information sharing is occurring.  Detecting
and proving such abuses is virtually impossible.
The reverse of this problem is the need to use the highest level of information
protection available when exchanging information internationally across potentially
poorly monitored and regulated foreign communication systems.  The current ban on
the export of 128-bit encrypted data seriously complicates system security design.
6.3 Suggestions For Further Research
This thesis was not intended to solve all the problems associated with developing
information systems for supplier integration.  It is hoped, however, that by
identifying the serious issues that remain insufficiently understood at this time, future
research efforts will be able to more accurately address them.  
The most serious issue raised in this research is a “chicken and egg” problem: Is it
necessary to have a close working relationship between a supplier and manufacturer
when building an information system to facilitate supplier integration?  If so, how can
the cycle be broken?  Strategies need to be identified that can effectively deal with this
paradox.  The cases examined here suggest that an emphasis on flexibility and
accommodation in all aspects of system development facilitate the development and
implementation process.  A positively reinforcing process is needed here.
Information exchange might foster trust, which would encourage partnership.  This
would result in closer information exchange and eventually interdependence.
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Extensive research on developing closer supplier relationships is being conducted as of
the writing of this thesis.  The results of that research will hopefully be readily
applicable to the situations described here.
Part of that research should include greater attention to ensuring that supplier
collaboration is a key element of the overall corporate strategy.  The business
processes themselves should not only be well defined before development begins but
also in clear alignment and support of the company’s business strategy.  One
potential approach to this issue is viewing the manufacturer and its supplier base not
as separate corporate entities but as part of an extensive “loosely coupled”
organization.  Only with business processes and their relationships well understood
can information technology be appropriately applied to facilitate data exchange where
it is warranted.  The key to effectively utilizing IT is to  effectively organize the
processes the systems already support to capitalize on the strengths and capabilities
the technology can provide.
Another aspect of defining business processes in alignment with overall strategy is the
question of information control.  To reap the benefits of supplier integration, and by
extension information systems for supplier integration, less rigid information sharing
policies are needed.  Depending on the situation, this might be achieved either by a
complete revision of existing policies, or by allowing more avenues for proposing
modifications.
The nature of the business processes will also affect another key research area:  the
technical and logical organization of the information system.  The two production
projects examined here took diametrically opposite approaches, with one building a
decentralized, application specific set of systems that are individually tailored to each
program, the other building a large, all-encompassing system intended to accommodate
every possible situation.  Neither has proven to be obviously more appropriate than
the other.  Identifying the situations which warrant one approach or the other would
clarify the decision making process.
Concurrent with information system organization should be research into cost
effective solutions to bandwidth and processing limitations.  This will add another
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order of magnitude to the complexity of the information these systems will be capable
of transferring.
New ERP (Enterprise Resource Planning) technologies, which are intended provide
significant data visibility and process improvements, are emerging as revolutionizing
forces in business management.  That these systems might be modified or extended to
integrate with the systems described here holds many interesting possibilities for
future investigation.  An obvious candidate for such an investigation is BCAG’s
DCAC/MRM initiative.
Finally, a clear problem in the systems examined here is lack of top level support and
competition among redundant initiatives for scarce resources.  These two issues are
closely interconnected.  It appears that often the motivation for developing systems
and processes for supplier collaboration comes from fear of falling behind, not from
recognition of the opportunity to move ahead.  Project managers need better tools for
making the business case for their projects.  Upper management needs improved
capability to recognize redundancies, opportunities for streamlining, and the potential
of new approaches.
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APPENDIX A:  LARP
This thesis is part of a joint effort between the Lean Aerospace Initiative (LAI) at
MIT in Cambridge, MA and the Lean Aircraft Research Program (LARP) at
Linköping University in Linköping, Sweden.54  
Introduction To LARP
The purpose of the LARP project is to develop rules and conditions governing highly
effective relationships between systems integrators, customers and their major
suppliers in the aerospace industry.  Special attention is given to the unique
conditions for the aerospace area, such as strict rules for airworthiness, the mix
between military and civil aircraft business, company culture, and the turbulent
situation with a rapid restructuring of the marketplace.
LARP’s goal, from a systems integrator perspective, is to develop models,
methodologies and tools for effective relationships between a systems integrator,
customers and its major suppliers in the aerospace industry regarding technology,
economy, competence, culture, product and market strategies.
Four objectives for the project have been identified:
• To identify criteria and incentives for successful relations between systems
integrator, customers and major suppliers.
• To determine purchasing strategy based on product/market strategy, technique,
competence, economy and company culture.
• To optimize a system-integration of subsystems based on division of work,
technique, competence and different organization forms in order to achieve a
higher degree of integrated product development in the buyer/supplier relation.
                                                
54 http://lean.mit.edu
http://www.liu.se/org/imie/larp
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• To make the integrated product development process in the buyer/supplier
relation more effective in all phases through use of information technology,
standardized data and integrated development tools.
The Information Technology Infrastructure For
Collaborative Development Project
This thesis is a counterpart to the licentiate thesis by Anna Öhrwall Rönnbäck titled
Information Infrastructure in Collaborative Product Development Projects which is
part of LARP subproject/subgoal 4.55  
The motivation for her research is similar to the motivation for this thesis.  Ms.
Rönnbäck’s project, however, focuses primarily on how information technology can
be used to facilitate cross-company product development efforts.
The preliminary research results from LARP are:
• The internal IS/IT function seem not to be empowered enough to succeed with
infrastructure support projects.  They have the ideas and the skills, but not the
required organizational power to implement solutions as fast as could be done (in
collaborative development there is still no such solution in sight).
• The decisions must be taken on a strategic management level, by asking questions
such as: With who do we want to communicate and for what purpose? What
should be built?
• Upper management lack enough knowledge to make such decisions, which indeed
are difficult, since it often means to “explore unknown territories”.
• Their knowledge could be better if decision support tools were developed in this
area and experience spread from similar cases in other industries.
These findings are based on research conducted mainly at Saab, major suppliers, and
their internal IS/IT groups.
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55 Candidate for MSc, LARP and PhD candidate, International Graduate School of Management and
Industrial Engineering (IMIE), Linköping University, Sweden; Thesis Supervisor: Prof. Staffan Brege,
LARP, Linköping University; Readers: Dr. Göran Lindström, Linköping University and Dr. Mats
Nordlund, Saab Aerospace.
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DEFINITIONS & ABBREVIATIONS
The specific company associated with a term or acronym is noted in parentheses at
the end of the definition where applicable.
5S
Sweeping, Sorting, Standardization, Simplification, and Self-Discipline  (Boeing)
Advanced Quality System (AQS)
(Boeing)
Boeing Commercial Airplane Group (BCAG)
Build Position
A manufacturing position, control code, or workstation that is tasked with producing
a detail part, subassembly, assembly, or installation in it deliverable configuration.
(Boeing)
Build Position Control Drawing (BPCD)
An abbreviated pictorial reference drawing/dataset approved by Engineering that
reflects the as-built assembly or installation when no picture sheet drawing exists
within the engineering drawing tree.  This drawing captures the priorities of the
customer build position, which includes the application of key characteristics,
datums, tool or part indexes, and special instructions.  In addition, the following are
characteristics of BPCDs:
1. Data from existing drawings/datasets are used when applicable
2. The BPCDs are not used to alter or redefine the engineering configuration of a
part, component, subassembly, or installation.
3. Control point key characteristics noted on BPCDs must also be identified on
drawings for Engineering product definition.
4. The BPCDs are not used to define new parts.
(Boeing)
Build Position Owner (BPO)
The person responsible for coordinating all standard and reliable process activities for
a build positions.  (Boeing)
Build Position Standard Process (BPSP)
Complete documentation defining the standard process for each build position.  This
documentation contains all the information to establish and maintain a reliable
process. (Boeing)
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Build Tree
A chart that shows the customer-supplier relationship between build positions in the
manufacturing process.  It shows all designed-as-built engineering drawings or BPCDs
and identifies the BPO responsible for establishing the deliverables for each build
position.  (Boeing)
Collaborative Engineering
The design, development and production of new products in close collaboration
between the lead manufacturer and one or more suppliers.
Computer Aided Design (CAD)
The use of a computer in the preparation of drawing or design of an object or system.
Often implemented as a software application, a CAD system frequently requires
specialized hardware as well.
Configuration Management (CM)
Configuration Management data (LMA)
Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS)
Refers to standard software packages (as opposed to custom built applications).
Cross Functional Team (CFT)
(Boeing)
Define and Control Airplane Configuration and Manufacturing Resource
Management (DCAC/MRM)
(Boeing)
Determinant Assembly (DA)
(Boeing)
Design For Manufacture/Assembly (DFMA)
(Boeing)
Electronic Commerce
The conducting of business communication and transactions over networks and
through computers.  Includes EDI, electronic funds transfers, fax, etc.
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI)
The exchange of standardized document forms between different companies using
networks, such as the Internet.  As more and more companies get connected to the
Internet, EDI is becoming increasingly important as an easy mechanism for companies
to buy, sell, and trade information.  ANSI has approved a set of EDI standards known
as the X12 standards.
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP)
Definitions & Abbreviations
117
A business management system that integrates all facets of the business, including
planning, manufacturing, sales, and marketing.  As the ERP methodology has become
more popular, software applications have emerged to help business managers
implement ERP.
Extranet
A private network, real or virtual, implemented between specific organizations.
Usually an intranet that is partially accessible to authorized outsiders.  Whereas an
intranet resides behind a firewall and is accessible only to people who are members of
the same company or organization, an extranet provides various levels of accessibility
to outsiders.  You can access an extranet only if you have a valid username and
password, and your identity determines which parts of the extranet you can view.
Final Body Join (FBJ)
(Boeing)
Flowdown
Process in which key elements (i.e., engineering datums, key characteristics, and part-
to-tool and part-to-part indexes) are tiered down through the drawing and Build Trees
in a structured relationship to ensure continuity from installation to the detail level.
(Boeing)
HABIT
HVC/AQS Build Integration Tool (Boeing)
Hardware Variability Control (HVC)
Cross functional management of design and build processes that impact the fit,
performance, and service life of product hardware (Boeing)
International Business Organization (IBO)
(Boeing)
Information System  (IS)
A discrete set of information resources organized for the collection, processing,
maintenance, use, sharing, dissemination or disposition of information.56
Information Technology  (IT)
The broad subject concerned with all aspects of managing and processing information,
especially within a large organization or company.  Includes any equipment or
interconnected system or subsystems of equipment that is used in the automatic
acquisition, storage, manipulation, management, movement, control, display,
switching interchange, transmission, or reception, of data or information.  Includes
computers, ancillary equipment (such as printers, modems, scanners, etc.) , software,
                                                
56 44 USC § 3502 (8)
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firmware, and similar procedures, services, including support services.  Does not
include radar, sonar, radio, or television equipment.57  
Information Infrastructure
The set of information technology, telephones, data networks
Internet
The global network of computer networks that communicate using a common language
(TCP/IP).  The Internet is decentralized by design. Each Internet computer, called a
host, is independent. Its operators can choose which Internet services to use and
which local services to make available to the global Internet community. Remarkably,
this anarchy by design works exceedingly well.
Intranet
A network based on TCP/IP protocols (an internet) belonging to an organization,
usually a corporation, accessible only by the organization’s members, employees, or
others with authorization.  An intranet’s Web sites look and act just like any other
Web sites, but the firewall surrounding an intranet fends off unauthorized access.
Just In Time (JIT)
Supplying exactly the required products in exactly the required quantities at exactly
the required time.
Key Characteristic (KC)
Attributes or features (dimensions, specifications) of a material, part, assembly,
installations, or system in which variation from nominal has the most adverse effect
upon fit, performance, or service life. (Boeing)
Lean Aerospace Initiative (LAI)
LAI is an MIT research group which strives to define and foster dynamic,
fundamental change in both the US defense aircraft industry and government
operations over the next decade. By building on and extending the "lean" paradigm
through an organized process of research, the program seeks to develop the knowledge
base that will lead to greater affordability of systems, increased efficiency, and higher
quality. Longer-term results sought include enhancing the viability, technological
superiority, and competitiveness of the US defense aircraft industrial base.
Lean Enterprise Model (LEM)
(LAI)
Legacy System
A system in which a company or organization has already invested considerable time
and money.
                                                
57 40 USC § 759 (a)(2) and (a)(3)(B)
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Local Area Network (LAN)
A computer network that spans a relatively small area. Most LANs are confined to a
single building or group of buildings.
Lockheed-Martin Astronautics (LMA)
Lockheed-Martin Astronautics (LMA)
Lean Manufacturing
A manufacturing system that meets high throughput or service demands with very
little inventory.
Operations & Inspection Record (O&IR)
(Boeing)
Product Data Management (PDM)
A system which provides methods for organizing, structuring, and modifying
information to facilitate product development activities such as change control, design
release control, configuration management and engineering data administration.
Request For Information (RFI)
Request For Proposal (RFP)
Statement Of Work (SOW)
Statistical Process Control (SPC)
Supplier Data Requirements List (SDRL)
(Lockheed-Martin)
Variation Simulation Analysis (VSA)
Virtual Private Network (VPN)
Short for virtual private network, a network that is constructed by using public wires
to connect nodes.  These systems use encryption and other security mechanisms to
ensure that only authorized users can access the network and that the data cannot be
intercepted.
Wide Area Network (WAN)
A computer network that spans a relatively large geographical area.  Typically, a
WAN consists of two or more local-area networks (LANs).  Computers connected to
a wide-area network are often connected through public networks, such as the
telephone system. They can also be connected through leased lines or satellites.
Wing Responsibility Center (WRC)
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(Boeing)
World Class Competitiveness (WCC )
(Boeing)
World Wide Web (WWW)
A graphical, easy to navigate interface for looking at documents on the Internet.
Y2K
Literally short for “Year 2000”, it refers to the pervasive problem that many
applications are designed to handle only 20th-century dates -- dates that begin with
“19”.  For example, most programs represent dates in the form MM-DD-YY, so the
date 10-5-96 is October 5, 1996.  But what about the date 10-5-05.  Is that 1905 or
2005?  There is no way to distinguish between these two dates.
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